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HENRY v. MISSISSIPPI AND THE
ADEQUATE STATE GROUND:
PROPOSALS FOR A REVISED
DOCTRINE

More than a century ago, the then former Justice Curtis reminded
the Bar that "questions of jurisdiction were questions of power as
between the United States and the several States." 1 Accordingly, any
expansion of the jurisdiction of federal courts is an occasion for
alarm for those to whom the slogan of "state's rights" is a substitute
for analysis. Justice Curtis was aware, however, that Scylla and
Charybdis were both to be avoided. Failure to extend the jurisdiction of federal courts to appropriate cases may be as great a disservice to the federal system as an undue expansion of that jurisdiction. 2 The charting of a course between these hazards would be difficult enough if, as in the legend, the location of the hazards were
stationary. The difficulty is compounded, however, by the necessity
of giving due consideration to changes in federal-state relationships.
Terrance Sanda!ow is Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
Author's Acknowledgment: l wish to express my gratitude to my colleagues Professors Jesse H. Choper and John J. Cound for their valuable suggestions in the
preparation of this article.
12 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF
2

Jbid.

B. R. Cmms 341 (Curtis ed. 1879).
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Jurisdictional rules formulated in 1789 or in the aftermath of the
Civil War are not necessarily adequate to the problems of 1965.
These considerations suggest both the difficulty and the delicacy
of the task which the Court appears to have set itself last Term in
Henry v. Mississippi. 3 That decision, if I read it correctly, strongly
intimates that at least five Justices are prepared to undertake-perhaps have already undertaken-a major reassessment of the Court's
jurisdiction to review judgments of state courts, the first such reassessment since the decision in Murdock v. City of Memphis4
exactly ninety years earlier. 5
Murdock established that the presence in a case of a federal question adequate to permit the exercise of jurisdiction did not confer
upon the Court a general power to decide all of the questions presented. We need not pause for extended inquiry into whether that
result was constimtionally compelled; 6 the decision has not been
a 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
4

20 Wall. 590 (1875).

5 Major modifications of the Court's jurisdiction did, of course, occur during
this period through legislation. The Judiciary Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 790, for the first
time extended the Court's jurisdiction to cases in which a state court upheld a
claim of federal right. And the Judiciary Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 726, together with
the Judges' Bill in 1925, 43 Stat. 936, conferred discretionary jurisdiction over a
wide category of cases which theretofore had been within the mandatory jurisdiction of the Court. See generally, FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, THE BusINESS OF THE SuPREME CouRT 211-16, 265-66 (1928).
6 Mr. Justice Bradley, dissenting in Murdock, argued that it was not a constitutional requirement because Article III "declares that the judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the
United States, and treaties made under their authority-not to all questions, but to
all cases." 20 Wall. at 641. The argument finds some support in the familiar doctrine that federal courts in the exercise of original jurisdiction under the "arising
under" clause may decide both federal and non-federal questions. Hurn v. Oursler,
289 U.S. 238 (1933); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824);
Note, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 1018 (1962),
More recently, Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Fay v. Noia,. 372 U.S. 391, 46667 (1963), urged the contrary view as implicit in the division of state and federal
power marked out by the Constitution, a position strongly supported by the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), A general power in the Supreme Court to review questions of state law in the face of an authoritative declaration by the state courts would plainly be incompatible with the constitutional
overtones of that doctrine. On this view, the power of federal courts exercising
original jurisdiction to decide questions of state law provides no support for the
exercise of a similar power by the Supreme Court on review of state decisions because in the latter situation, unlike the former, there has been an authoritative declaration of local law by the state court in the particular case.
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seriously questioned for nearly a century7 and the premises upon
which it rests are so deeply imbedded in our law that it may fairly
be deemed a part of our "working constitution." 8
In the years since Murdock the Court has been concerned only
with the problem of defining what questions, other than those which
confer jurisdiction, are open to its review. The product of these labors is the familiar rule that in a case raising a question within its
jurisdiction the Court will examine any non-federal grounds upon
which the decision below may have rested to determine whether
they independently and adequately support the state court judgment. 9 If the Court did not to that extent encroach upon the function of state courts to declare state law, vindication of federal rights
would be subject to impermissible interference by a decision upon
state grounds, for it is an obvious corollary of Murdock that a state
ground of decision which is adequate insulates the judgment from
reversal by the Court. 10
The significance of Henry v. Mississippi is in its intimation that a
majority of the Court apparently are prepared to redefine the adequate state ground doctrine with a view toward substantial restriction of the situations in which a non-federal ground of decision will
be adequate to preclude review of the federal questions presented.
Although Henry is directly concerned only with the effect of state
procedural rules on the vindication of federal rights, an appreciation
of that problem requires an examination of the adequate state
ground doctrine in the varied contexts in which it is relevant. After
a statement of Henry, therefore, I shall proceed to a general analysis
7But cf. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 711-937 (1953).
8 See Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84, 111
n. 80 (1959).
9 The rule is usually stated negatively: "Where the decision of the state court is
deemed to rest upon a non-federal ground which independently and adequately
supports the state court judgment, the Supreme Court will not exercise jurisdiction
to review notwithstanding the raising of federal questions upon the state court record or the decision of these questions by the state court." RoBERTSON & KIRKHAM,
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES § 89, at 163 (Wolfson &
Kurland ed. 1951).

10 In Murdock the Court indicated that a judgment resting on an adequate nonfederal ground ought to be affirmed. The Court's general practice, however, has
been ·to treat the adequate non-federal ground as a bar to the exercise of its jurisdiction. See Note, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1375, 1376-77 (1961).
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of the doctrine and to proposals for its modification based upon that
analysis.

I.

HENRY

v.

MISSISSIPPI

Of all the problems raised by Henry, none is more troublesome than that of determining the material facts. Almost the first
lesson taught in law school is that "facts of person, time, [and] place
... are presumably immaterial unless stated [by the court] to be
material. As a rule the law is the same for all persons, at all times,
and at all places within the jurisdiction of the court." 11 Yet, even
though not mentioned by the Court, is it really immaterial that the
petitioner was not merely a man charged with disturbing the peace,
but Aaron Henry, a Negro resident of Clarksdale, Mississippi, and
president of both the Coahoma County Branch of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People and of its State
Conference of Branches? 12 ls it, moreover, immaterial that the prosecution was commenced in 1962 in Mississippi13 and not at another
time and in another place? The traditional answer to these questions,
one suspects, is neither entirely realistic nor necessarily desirable.
Yet more than a lawyer's conservatism argues for caution in accepting a conclusion that the Court was or ought to have been influenced
by such factors, particularly in a case which touches what historically has been one of the more sensitive areas of federal-state relationships.
A. THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE STATE COURTS

Aaron Henry was tried and convicted on a charge of disturbing
the peace by making indecent proposals to and an assault upon a
hitchhiker to whom he allegedly had given a ride. He was sentenced
11 Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE

L.J.

161, 169-

70 (1930).
12

Petition for Certiorari, p. 19.

On the use (or abuse) of the legal machinery of certain states to interfere
with the civil rights movement, see id. at 19-24; UNITED STATES CoMMISSION ON
C1VIL RIGHTS, THE 50 STATES REPORT 6-15 (1961); MARSHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIVIL
RIGHTS (1964); Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed
Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction To Abort State
Court Trial, 113 U. OF PA. L. REv. 793 (1965); Gellhorn, A Decade of Desegregation-Retrospect and Prospect, 9 UTAH L. REv. 3 (1964); Lusky, Racial Discrimination and the Federal Law: A Problem in Nullification, 63 CoLUM, L. REv. 1163
(1963).
13
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to sixty days in jail and a fine of $250, both well below the maximum
permitted by law. 14 At the trial, the evidence against Henry consisted primarily of the testimony of the alleged victim. In an attempt
to corroborate this testimony, the state introduced the testimony of
a police officer who had searched Henry's car shortly after his
arrest, which, in turn, had taken place within a few hours of the
alleged crime. The latter testimony tended to corroborate that of
the complaining witness by substantiating its accuracy concerning
details of the interior of Henry's car that could have been observed
only by one who had been inside the car. 15
No objection was made to the officer's testimony at the time it
was offered or, indeed, until the close of the state's case, at which
time counsel for Henry, in the course of a motion for a directed
verdict, urged that the testimony was the product of an unlawful
search. Although the basis for this claim was not then stated by
counsel, it rested upon the fact that, as the officer had testified, the
search was not authorized by a warrant or incident to an arrest, but
was justified, if at all, solely upon the basis of permission given by
Henry's wife. The motion was summarily denied. Upon completion
of the defense, the motion was renewed, without further specification, and again summarily denied.
On appeal, 16 the Misisssippi Supreme Court initially reversed the
conviction without reference to Henry's claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment.17 It held the search unlawful under the state constitution and, therefore, that evidence resulting from it was inadmissible
under a state exclusionary rule long antedating Mapp v. Ohio. 18
14 Miss. CooE 1942 § 2089.5 (Supp. 1964), under which Henry was charged, authorizes a sentence not to exceed six months in jail and fine of $500. The justice of
the peace before whom the case was originally tried gave Henry the maximum
sentence. Petition for Certiorari, p. 4. A trial de novo in the County Court apparently resulted in the lighter sentence. See Henry v. State, 154 So.2d 289, 290 (Miss.
1963).

15 Both the complaining witness and police officer testified that an ashtray in the
car was filled with Dentyne chewing gum wrappers and that a cigarette lighter was
not properly functioning. Id. at 294.
16 The Circuit Court of Bolivia County, apparently an intermediate appellate
court, had affirmed the conviction. Id. at 290.
17

With respect to the merits of the issue under the Fourteenth Amendment,

compare Roberts v. United States, 332 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1964), with Cofer v. United

States, 37 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1930).
18

367 U.S. 643 (1961). See Tucker v.-State, 128 Miss. 211 (1922).
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Reversal was required, notwithstanding the customary rule that an
appeal will not lie from the introduction of evidence to which contemporaneous objection has not been made, for two reasons. First,
the court apparently assumed that Henry had been represented only
by out-of-state counsel unfamiliar with local procedure. 19 Second, it
found that the case came within the "narrow rule" established by an
earlier decision, that "[e]rrors affecting fundamental rights are exceptions to the rule that questions not raised in the trial court cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal." 20
After the opinion was handed down, a "Suggestion of Error"
was filed by the state pointing out that Henry had been represented
at the trial by local as well as nonresident counsel. 21 The court
thereupon withdrew its first opinion and affirmed the conviction in
a new opinion identical with the first except for differences concerning the effect of failure to make timely objections. The court
now concluded that that omission resulted in a "waiver" of the right
to object. Moreover, the "narrow rule" excepting errors affecting
fundamental rights from the prohibition upon raising issues to which
rn That assumption is not explicitly stated in the Court's opinion. However, in
explaining the reason for departing from its customary practice, the Court did say:
"It appears from the records reaching this Court that numerous cases have been
tried recently in this state by nonresident attorneys who have traveled great distance to appear in defense of persons charged with misdemeanor and minor offenses, but who are not adept in the technique of jury trials in criminal court in
Mississippi." Petition for Certiorari, p. Ila. The statement, obviously, was relevant
only on the assumption that Henry had been represented by a nonresident attorney.
2 0 Brooks v. State, 209 Miss. 150, 155 (1950). The court relied on Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), for a similar proposition, although seemingly only as
persuasive authority and not because it considered itself bound by that decision.

21 The Suggestion of Error also informed the court that one of Henry's out-ofstate attorneys was "regular full time counsel for the NAACP in New York City
and, since the appointment of Thurgood Marshall to Federal Judiciary, has been
general counsel for that organization." See Brief in Support of Suggestion of Error,
reprinted as Appendix 4 in Answer to Petition for Certiorari, p. A40. Inclusion of
that information in the Suggestion of Error may be given a sinister interpretation
as suggested by Henry's counsel, see Petition for Certiorari, pp. 22-23, or it may be
deemed justified by the wholly proper purpose of bringing to the court's attention
the experience of Henry's lead counsel and the consequent probability of his familiarity with the necessity for timely objection to inadmissible evidence. See Brief
for Respondent, p. 12.
Similarly conflicting inferences may be drawn from the information provided
the court that "[t]he writer is not alone in his feeling with respect to the opinion
of the court in this case. It has been discussed with numerous lawyers and judges
and each has urged the filing of this suggestion of error that the Court might reconsider its decision." Brief in Support of Suggestion of Error, supra, at A37.
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timely objection had not been made was now found to be even narrower: the earlier decision establishing that rule was now construed
to depend upon the incompetence of counsel. Henry had been
represented by three experienced trial lawyers of his own selection,
one of whom was from Mississippi. "In such circumstances, even if
honest mistakes of counsel in respect to policy or strategy or otherwise occur, they are binding upon the client as a part of the hazards
of courtroom battle." 22
B. THE OPINIONS IN THE SUPREME COURT

On certiorari, the Supreme Court divided three ways, a majority
concluding that the state court judgment should be vacated and the
case remanded to determine whether the failure of Henry's counsel
to object to the police officer's testimony at the time it was introduced resulted from a deliberate waiver of Henry's federal claim.23
The majority thus avoided, at least temporarily, the necessity of deciding whether the Mississippi judgment affirming the conviction
rested on a state ground adequate to preclude the assertion of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court. Avoidance of decision did not, however, deter the majority from an interesting and perhaps far-reaching discussion of the adequate state ground doctrine.
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, opened the discussion by stating that although the doctrine applies both to substantive
~nd procedural grounds, it is important nonetheless to distinguish
between the two. "Where the ground involved is substantive, the
determination of the federal question cannot affect the disposition if
the state court decision on the state law question is allowed to
stand." 24 Since, under the decision in Murdock the Court has no
power to revise state court judgments on questions of state law, "the
adequate nonfederal ground doctrine is necessary to avoid advisory
opinions." 25
These considerations, the opinion continues, are inapplicable
where the state ground is purely procedural. "A procedural default
which is held to bar challenge to a conviction in state courts, even on
22

154 So.2d at 296.

23 Although the Mississippi Supreme Coun stated that Henry had "waived his
right to object" to the testimony, it seems plain that it had not found an intentional
abandonment of the claim. The "waiver," more precisely, was a forfeiture resulting
from the failure to comply with state procedure.

24

379 U.S. at 446.

25

fd. at 447.
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federal constitutional grounds, prevents implementation of the federal right." 26 Accordingly, prior decisions establish, as a matter of
federal law, that "unless the state's insistence on compliance with its
procedural rule serves a legitimate state interest,"27 consideration of
federal claims by the Court is not precluded.
The majority opinion recognizes "a legitimate state interest" in
the state's requirement of a contemporaneous objection to the introduction of evidence, but goes on to suggest that on the record that
interest "may have been substantially served" by the motion for a
directed verdict. If the evidence were inadmissible, the trial judge
might have stricken it from the record, and if there were other competent evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction, the case could have
been submitted to the jury with appropriate cautionary instructions
to ignore the illegally obtained evidence.
A decision on whether the availability of this alternative negated
the state's interest in enforcing its contemporaneous objection rule
was, however, viewed as unnecessary because the record before the
Court suggested the possibility that the failure of Henry's counsel to
object when the evidence was introduced may have been attributable to a conscious waiver of the objection. 28 That question could
not be determined without a hearing, and a remand to permit such
a hearing, the Court said, would be particularly appropriate since,
even if the writ of certiorari were dismissed on the basis of an adequate state ground, the doctrine of Fay v. Noia 29 would permit
Henry to assert his federal claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding unless it could be shown that he had deliberately bypassed state
procedure. Permitting the. state courts to make an initial determina26

Ibid.

21

Ibid.

Several facts were cited in support of this possibility. (1) The state's Brief in
Support of its Suggestion of Error stipulated that the reversal of the conviction
should stand if any one of Henry's defense counsel would file an affidavit "that he
did not know that at some point in a trial in criminal court in Mississippi that an
objection to such testimony must have been made." (As thus stated, however, the
state's offer was irrelevant on the question whether defense counsel knew of the
contemporaneous objection rule.) (2) An affidavit filed by the state in the Supreme
Court asserted that when the officer's testimony was introduced one of Henry's
attorneys stood up as if to object and was pulled down by co-counsel. (3) The
record suggests that the failure to object might have been based on trial strategy.
Both the complaining witness and the officer testified that a cigarette lighter in the
car did not work. The defense called a mechanic who testified that he had repaired the lighter. Hence, counsel may, by not objecting to the officer's testimony,
have intended to discredit both of the state's witnesses. Id. at 450-52.
2s

29

372 U.S. 391,439 (1963). Fay is discussed in text infra, at notes 179-94.
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tion of waiver would not only decrease the burden on federal
courts; it would serve the cause of "harmonious federal-state judicial
relations," 30 perhaps ameliorating the irritation created by federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction.
Mr. Justice Black dissented. Without considering the state's interest in enforcement of its contemporaneous objection rule, he concluded that the forfeiture under state law was inadequate to preclude review because previous state decisions established that the
Mississippi court had power to consider Henry's federal claim and
had at times exercised its discretion to hear similar claims notwithstanding failure to make a contemporaneous objection. Under Williams v. Georgia,31 therefore, the state ground was inadequate.
Mr. Justice Harlan (joined by Justices Clark and Stewart) also
dissented but on quite different grounds. Although apparently not
in disagreement with Mr. Justice Brennan's formulation of the test
for determining the adequacy of state procedural grounds, he found
the state's interest in the integrity of its procedure plainly adequate
to bar review of Henry's federal claim by the Court. 32 Mr. Justice
Harlan saw more in the majority's opinion, however, than a simple
failure to assess properly the state's interest in its contemporaneous
objection rule. That opinion, as he read it, "portends a severe dilution, if not complete abolition of the concept of 'adequacy' as pertaining to state procedural grounds," in effect "an early step towards extending in one way or another the doctrine of Fay v. Noia
to direct review." 33
C. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECISION

The initial question raised by the Court's decision in Henry is
whether it does, as suggested by Mr. Justice Harlan, look toward a
substantial revision of the adequate state ground doctrine or whether
30

379 U.S. at 452.

31

349 U.S. 375 (1955). See discussion in text infra, at notes 158-62.

32 The majority's suggestion that the purpose of the contemporaneous objection
rule might have been substantially served by the motion for a directed verdict was,
in Mr. Justice Harlan's view, "fanciful." 379 U.S. at 458. The reference to the assertedly unlawful search consisted of a single sentence, in the middle of a motion
directed to other matters, which failed even to specify the basis upon which the
search was claimed to be unlawful. "It is simply unrealistic in this context to have
expected the trial judge to pick out the single vague sentence from the directed
verdict motion and to have acted upon it with the refined imagination the Court
would require of him." Id. at 461.

83

Id. at 457.
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it has a more limited significance. Several factors point toward the
latter reading. Nothing in Mr. Justice Brennan's discussion of the
adequate state ground doctrine explicitly suggests an intention to
apply other than "settled principles."34 The only attempt to state a
general standard for determining the adequacy of state procedural
grounds is, as one commentator has already observed, "a fair synthesis of prior decisions." 35 There is, finally, the imponderable
alluded to above, that the Court was influenced by the possibility
that Henry's prosecution was a consequence of his active participation in the civil rights movement. 36
Nevertheless, there is as much and perhaps more reason to conclude that Mr. Justice Harlan's surmise regarding the Court's direction is well founded. If the Court's concern were with Henry as an
individual, rather than with preparing the way for revision of the
adequate state ground doctrine, avoidance of the bar to review
posed by Henry's failure to comply with state procedure might as
easily have been accomplished on the ground that the state supreme
court's enforcement of its forfeiture rule was discriminatory and,
therefore, inadequate under a long line of earlier cases.37 Although a
decision on that ground would have involved a minor inroad upon
the adequate state ground doctrine, 38 it would have had the virtue of
extremely limited precedential significance. The Court's failure to
adopt that approach suggests that it had a more far-reaching objective.
There is additional evidence of the Court's direction in its curious
insistence that the standard for determining adequacy stated in the
opinion "will not inevitably lead to a plethora of attacks on the
application of state procedural rules," 39 a reassurance which would
34

Id. at 452.

Recent Developments, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 710, 713 (1965); see also Note, supra
note 10, at 1388-91.
35

36 Both the Petition for Certiorari and Petitioner's Brief on the Merits urged as
a ground for reversal: "The State of Mississippi has used its criminal and judicial
process as a• punitive measure, to enforce racial segregation and to interfere with
freedom of association...." See Petition for Certiorari, p. 18; Brief for Petitioner,
p. 36.
37

See discussion in text infra, at note 143.

38

See discussion in text infra, at notes 155-56.

39 379 U.S. at 448 n. 3. Rather more puzzling is the Court's statement in the same
footnote that "where the state rule is a reasonable one and clearly announced to
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hardly have been necessary if the Court contemplated merely the
application of "settled principles." Moreover, the doubt cast upon
the state's contemporaneous objection rule, the adequacy of which
was hardly subject to question under earlier cases, 40 suggests at least
that while the bottle-the verbal formulation for determining adequacy-is old, its contents may soon be replaced.
In a more political context, in sum, the Court's opinion might
fairly be read as throwing up a "trial balloon." The implication that
a change in doctrine is under consideration is manifest, yet the holding is sufficiently narrow that retreat is not foreclosed. A reconsideration of the adequate state ground doctrine is, therefore, plainly in
order.
II.

SUBSTANCE AND PRoCEDURE-AND MoRE RELEVANT
CONSIDERATIONS

The Court's distinction between state substantive and procedural grounds has a surface plausibility that, on further examination, fails to withstand analysis. The distinction rests in part, it will
be recalled, on the premise that determination of the federal question cannot affect disposition of the case if the state court decision
on the question of state substantive law is allowed to stand. The
premise is equally true, however, of a state court decision with respect to procedure. If it is allowed to stand, Supreme Court decision
of the question of federal law cannot affect disposition of the case.
In either event, whether the state ground is substantive or procedural, once the Supreme Court decided that it should be allowed
to stand, the adequate state ground doctrine "is necessary to avoid
advisory opinions." 41 The "advisory opinion" rationale, in other
defendant and counsel, application of the waiver doctrine will yield the same result as that of the adequate nonfederal ground doctrine in the vast majority of
cases." At no point does the Court identify "the waiver doctrine" to which it refers;
surely Henry does not in terms define such a doctrine. It seems a permissible inference, therefore, that "the waiver doctrine" is that laid down in Fay v. Noia,
that, absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, failure to comply with state procedure respecting the presentation of federal claims does not bar review of such
claims by a federal court.
40

See discussion in text infra, at notes 171-77.

379 U.S. at 447. Significantly, Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945), in which
the argument based upon avoidance of advisory opinions was apparently first articulated, involved a plainly procedural rule, the power of a state court to transfer
a cause over which it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. That this justification for
41
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words, is concerned with the appropriate disposition of the case
once it is determined that the state ground is adequate. It does not
speak to the questions which state grounds are adequate or how that
is to be determined.
The other basis for distinction suggested by the Court-that a
procedural default held to bar assertion of a federal claim differs
from a substantive ground because it prevents implementation of a
federal right-is no more satisfactory. A state substantive ground
may also bar implementation of a federal right. 42 The question before the Court is the same whether the state ground is substantive or
procedural, i.e., whether it ought to preclude the Court's consideration of the federal claim.
The fact that but a single question is involved does not, obviously,
mean that there must be a single answer to all the variant simations
to come before the Court, nor does it mean that the Court must
adopt the same premises or pursue the same policies in all simations.
Differences in the intensity of the federal interest, 43 the extent to
which the state ground interferes with that interest, and the importance to the state of the policy underlying the state ground of decithe adequate state ground doctrine applies equally to state substantive and procedural grounds was, moreover, explicitly recognized in Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 429-30.
4 2 See, e.g., Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers' Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157
(1917); Gaar, Scott & Co. v. Shannon, 223 U.S. 468 (1912). The distinction be-

tween substance and procedure is as elusive here as in other contexts. For present
purposes, however, state law prescribing consequences for prelitigation conduct, as
in the cases just cited, may fairly be deemed substantive.
Cases raising the question whether a state has impaired the obligation of a contract or deprived a person of property without due process of law, while analytically distinguishable, also involve a risk that the state ground may interfere with
the protection of a federal right. In such cases, where the Constitution protects a
right created by state law, a determination by the state court that the right never
existed at state law does not technically bar implementation of federal right, since
the existence of the latter depends upon the former. Neverthless, power to avoid
the federal right is inherent in the authority of the state court to decide the question of state law. See discussion in text infra, at notes 144-48.
43 With rare exception, this factor has not been explicitly stressed in the Court's
opinions. But cf. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286-87 (1936). Nevertheless
at least one commentator has observed that "the adequ'acy of a procedural bar
to a federal claim seems to depend on the Court's assessment of the importance
of the procedure when set against the federal claim." Note, supra note 10, at 1389.
And, whatever the difficulties of such an assessment, appropriate accommodation
of federal and state interests seems to require that it at least be attempted. See
discussion in text infra, at notes 165-211.
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sion call for differences in result. In assessing these differences, distinctions which might be made between substance and procedure
seem of less importance than several others that might be suggested. Thus, the strength of the federal interest will vary according
to whether the effect of the non-federal ground of decision is to
produce a result the same as or different from that which would be
produced by a decision sustaining the federal claim involved. 44 So
also, different considerations are presented depending upon whether
the state ground of decision concerns a refusal to adjudicate or leads
to adjudication in a manner allegedly at variance with federal law. 45
Difference may perhaps also exist between those cases in which the
party asserting the federal claim has invoked the jurisdiction of the
state court and those in which he is in a defensive posture. 46
The former alternative, in each instance, plainly presents a weaker
basis for intervention by the Supreme Court. Yet, even in such
cases, as subsequent discussion suggests, the exercise of jurisdiction
may be warranted, although on grounds which deviate somewhat
from traditional analysis. It is important at this point to note that the
adequate state ground doctrine has two aspects. The first, which is
emphasized by the traditional statement of the doctrine, 47 merely
states the consequences of a determination that the state court judgment rests upon as adequate non-federal ground. The second and
more important aspect of the doctrine is concerned with a definition
of the circumstances under which the Court will re-examine the
state court's determination of non-federal issues.

III. REvrnw OF JUDGMENTS THAT PROTECT FEDERAL

RIGHTS

The justification for the Court's encroachment upon the
function of state courts to declare authoritatively the content of
state law 48 establishes the initial limitation of the Court's power: a
non-federal ground of decision may be held inadequate to preclude
review of a federal question only if a federal interest would be
served thereby. Accordingly, a decision which upholds a state
statute under the federal constitution while invalidating it under the
state constitution is generally beyond the Court's jurisdiction. In
such a case there is no danger of infringement of a federal right:
44

See text infra, at notes 48--68.

45

See text infra, at notes 68-121.

47

See note 9 supra.

46

See text infra, at note 211.

48

See text supra, at note 10.
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since the judgment gives no effect to the statute, the asserted federal
right is accorded full protection and the federal interest is satisfied
whether or not the state court was correct in its assessment of federal law. Similarly, the Court generally lacks jurisdiction when the
state court has invalidated a state statute under both state and federal
constitutions. 49 It is, of course, true that the Judiciary Act of 191450
recognizes a federal interest in freeing the states of restrictions imposed by state courts under the supposed obligation of federal law. 51
But a decision that the state court has incorrectly interpreted federal
law will in no way advance that interest, since the statute will not be
given effect in any event.
For these reasons, the Court's decision in United States Mortgage
Co. v. Matthews5 2 seems incorrect. In that case, the state court had
construed a contract in the manner contended for by a party claiming rights under the Contract Clause and, on that basis, held a
statute invalid as impairing the obligation of the contract. The Supreme Court reversed, disagreeing on the interpretation of the contract. Its power to consider this question of state law was affirmed
summarily by reference to the "well established doctrine that where
the contract clause is invoked this Court must determine for itself
the nature and effect of the alleged agreement.... " 53 The Court
seemingly failed to recognize that, in the cases that had established
the doctrine, review of the state-law question by the Supreme Court
was necessary, as Mr. Justice Roberts later put it, "in order that the
constitutional mandate may not become a dead letter." 54 No such
justification existed in Matthews. State law had been interpreted
favorably to the federal right. Matthews can be justified, if at all,
only on the ground that decision of the non-federal issue by the
Supreme Court permitted it to avoid decision of a constitutional
question. 55 Acceptance of that justification, which finds no support
49

See RoBERTSON & KIRKHAM, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 98.

50

See note 5 supra.

51

See also Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940).

52

293 U.S. 232 (1934).

54

Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938).

5a

Id. at 236.

55 The decision is to that extent distinguishable from those holding that a determination of the invalidity of a state statute under the state constitution is adequate to preclude review. See text supra, preceding note 49. In the latter cases,
review of the state ground of decision would not permit the Court to avoid decision of the federal constitutional issue.
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in other decisions of the Court, 56 would lead to a virtual reversal of
Murdock. It would permit the Court, in effect, to exercise a general
superintendence over matters of local law, a result having so profound an impact on the distribution of power between the states
and the federal government that it is hardly to be justified by the
desirability of avoiding constitutional questions.
In general, therefore, where the state court judgment protects the
federal right asserted, a non-federal ground of decision is adequate
to preclude the assertion of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court. Once
it is concluded that the state ground ought not itself to be subject
to re-examination by the Court, the "advisory opinion" rationale
articulated by Mr. Justice Jackson in Herb v. Pitcairn 51 comes into
play to preclude consideration of the federal question presented.
Any discussion of that question would not alter the legal relationship of the parties, since the judgment rendered by the state court
would stand whether or not it correctly ruled upon the federal
question. All that would be accomplished by Supreme Court review would be an essay on the federal question, bearing the imprimatur of the Court but devoid of significance in the case at bar.
Yet even in such cases review of the federal question may occasionally be warranted. Although Herb v. Pitcairn contains overtones
of constitutional or statutory limitations on the assertion of jurisdiction by the Court, 58 commentators have generally agreed that
refusal to review a federal question where, the judgment is based
upon an adequate state ground rests upon a self-imposed rule of
judicial administration. 59 Generally, nonetheless, the already heavy
burdens on the Court60 and the desirability of avoiding constitutional decisions will counsel against an assumption of jurisdiction.
But cases may arise in which a statement by the Court on the federal
issues presented would serve a useful purpose. 61 Perhaps the most
56

See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 341, 346 (1926).

57

324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945).

The reasons underlying the adequate state ground doctrine, Mr. Justice Jackson wrote, are "found in the partitioning of power between the state and federal
judicial system and in the limitations of our own jurisdiction. Our only power
over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge
federal rights. And our power is to correct wrong judgments, not to review
opinions. We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion ...." Ibid.
58

59

Note, supra note 10, at 1377-79; Note, 49 YALE L.J. 1463 (1940).

60

See Hart, supra note 8.

61

See text infra, at notes 118-21.
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frequently recurring of the situations in which an assertion of such
power by the Court would be useful is that in which the state
court has invalidated a statute under both state and federal constitutions. Although the state ground in that situation is, technically,
both "independent" and "adequate," the frequency with which state
courts, in interpreting state constitutions, rely on federal decisions
construing a similar provision in the federal constitution suggests
that the Court ought not to be blind to the leadership that it in fact
exerts in this area. 62 Even when it does not seem likely that the
judgment in the case at bar will be affected, thought must be given
also to the potential impact in other cases and the desirability of
assuring that "the responsibility for striking down or upholding
state legislation be fairly placed." 63 In such cases, there is no overriding policy that requires the Court to stay its hand. The independence of state courts would not be sacrificed since the judgment
would be undisturbed. Moreover, the record before the Court will
normally be fully adequate to illumine the issues and the Court will
frequently have the benefit of adversary proceedings, 64 thus removing the primary objections to "advisory opinions." 65
Although the Court seems never to have taken jurisdiction for
this purpose, several decisions suggest its power to do so.66 In each,
it was unclear whether the judgment below rested upon a state
ground or upon a conclusion regarding the obligations imposed by
federal law. Departing from its customary practice of declining to
exercise jurisdiction until tht ambiguity in the state court judgment
is resolved, 67 the Court considered the federal issue on the merits,
held that the state courts were free of federal compulsion, and vacated the judgment to permit a determination by the state court

L.J. 1463

62

Note, 49 YALE

63

Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551,557 (1940).

(1940).

6 4 Petitioner's or appellant's interest in resolution of the issue by the Supreme
Court is assured by the fact that it has invoked the Court's jurisdiction, presumably because its interest in the issue is continuing and not exhausted by a decision
of the particular case. Respondent or appellee may of course also have such continuing interest in some situations.
65

See LOCKHART, KAMISAR & CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 51-53 (1964).

66 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Missouri ex rel.
Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950); cf. Patterson v. Alabama, 294
U.S. 600 (1935). See, also, discussion in text infra, at notes 118-21.
67

Note, supra note 6.
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whether non-federal grounds alone would sustain the judgment. A
similar technique, but without the necessity of vacating the judgment, might be employed even where the grounds of decision are
not ambiguous. Indeed, almost precisely this course was proposed
in Murdock. 68

IV.

THE REFUSAL To ADJUDICATE A FEDERAL CLAIM

Quite different questions are presented when the non-federal
ground of decision consists of a refusal by the state court to grant
a remedy for a claimed federal right or to exercise jurisdiction in a
proceeding commenced to enforce such a right. If, by virtue of the
Supremacy Clause or another provision of the Constitution, state
courts must entertain an action based upon federal rights, the state
court's refusal, being inconsistent with the Constitution, is plainly
not adequate to support the judgment. The initial question, therefore, is whether the Constitution does impose such an obligation on
the state courts. If ( or to the extent that) the answer to that question is in the negative, there is a further question whether the state
ground of decision may nonetheless be inadequate to preclude review by the Court.
Several lines of cases suggest that the state courts may not, consistently with the Constitution, decline to adjudicate a claim of
federal right. Yet, both the precedents and the reasons in support of
such a rule are sufficiently unclear that a fresh look at the question
seems warranted.
A. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND FEDERAL STATUTORY CLAIMS

Under prevailing doctrine, a state court may not decline to adjudicate a federal claim if it would enforce an analogous statecreated right. It is still an open question, however, whether it must
provide a forum for enforcement of the federal claim even when it
does not entertain similar suits arising under local law. As an original
matter, it might well be argued that the Constitution does not require the state court to hear the federal claim in either event. The
Supremacy Clause does not, in terms, require it to do so. Historically, indeed, the concern was that the state courts would not be
permitted to assume jurisdiction of actions to enforce federal rights 69
and it was not until 1876, in Claflin v. Houseman,;o that the question
68

20 Wall. at 635-36.

70 93 U.S. 130 (1876).

69

See Note, 73

HARV,

L. REv. 1551 (1960).
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of the power of state courts was finally put to rest. 71 Although the
conversion of that power to a duty is now so firmly established
that it is perhaps beyond reconsideration, 72 an examination of the
cases establishing the duty, beyond suggesting what might have
been, may illumine still unresolved questions.
In Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 73 one of the questions presented was the duty of a state court "when its ordinary
jurisdiction as prescribed by local laws is appropriate to the occasion and is invoked in conformity with those laws, to take cognizance of an action to enforce a right of civil recovery arising under
the act of Congress and susceptible of adjudication according to the
prevailing rules of procedure." 74 Although Congress had not, as the
Court carefully observed, attempted to impose that obligation on
state courts, the question was, nonetheless, answered affirmatively.
The state court had declined to exercise jurisdiction because the
policy manifested by the Act of Congress was not in accord with
the policy of the state. 75 That reason, the Court said, was
quite inadmissible, because it presupposes what in legal contemplation does not exist. When Congress, in the exertion of
the power confided to it by the Constitution, adopted that act,
it spoke for all the people and all the States, and thereby established a policy for all. That policy is as much the policy
of Connecticut as if the act had emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in the courts of
the State. 76
The Court went on to quote extensively from Clafiin v. Houseman
without, however, noting that that decision was concerned only
71 The power of the state coons is, of course, subject to the power of Congress
to confer exclusive jurisdiction on federal courts. See HART & WECHSLER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 373-74 (1953).
7 2 In recent years, nevertheless, the Court has given renewed meaning to the
maxim that constitutional questions are always open to re-examination. See Kurland, Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and ExecUtive Branches of the Government," 78 HARv. L. REv. 143, 164 (1964).

1s 223 U.S. 1 (1912).

14

Jd. at 56-57.

A second and somewhat related reason, that it would be "inconvenient and
confusing;, for the state courts to apply federal Jaw to some cases and the differing
standards of state law to similar cases not governed by the Act, was also advanced.
The argument was rejected, partly because the Court doubted the factual premises
on which it was based and partly because it apparently considered the justification
impermissible in any event.
75

76

223 U.S. at 57.
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with the power of state courts to adjudicate claims based on federal
law, not with whether they had a duty to do so.
The fact that a state court derives its existence and functions
from the state laws is no reason why it should not afford
relief; because it is subject also to the laws of the United
States, and is just as much bound to recognize these as operative within the State as it is to recognize the state laws. 77

Mondou is usually read as establishing only that a state must enforce a federally created right if it enforces analogous forum-created
rights, 78 a proposition which was reaffirmed in McKnett v. St. Louis
& S.F. Ry. 19 That reading is reinforced by the Court's subsequent
decision in Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R.,80 sustaining the
refusal of a state court to exercise jurisdiction over a federal statutory claim under circumstances in which it would also have declined
to adjudicate a state-created claim.
Yet, it seems plain rhat the reasons underlying the decision in
Mondou will support a broader doctrine than the Court purported
to lay down. If the duty of the state courts to accept jurisdiction
flows from the obligation to respect federal policy, there is no
apparent reason why the state should not be required to accept
jurisdiction even though it would not entertain an analogous forumcreated right. Federal policy is the same whatever lines the state has
drawn in defining the jurisdiction of its courts over local claims.
If the state may not assert a policy at variance with that expressed
by the federal law, adjudication of the claim would seem to be
required even in the absence of discrimination since, insofar as the
local jurisdictional rule prevents adjudication, it is to that extent,
under the reasoning of Mondou, inconsistent with the policy underlying the federal claim. Some support for this view may be found
in Testa v. Katt, 81 the most recent of the Court's decisions touching
the problem. There, a state court had declined to enforce a claim
for treble damages provi :led by federal statute on the ground that
it was contrary to state policy to enforce a foreign penal statute.
Brushing aside the distil ctions between "penal" and other claims
11 Jd.

78

at 58.

See, e.g., Note, supra note 69, at 1553; Note, 47

MINN.

L. REv. 815, 827 (1963).

292 U.S. 230 (1934). See also Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S.
211, 221-23 (1916).
79

so279 U.S. 377 (1929).

81

330 U.S. 386 (1947).
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suggested by earlier decisions, the Supreme Court reversed, chiefly
in reliance upon Clafiin and Mondou. Although Testa in fact involved discrimination against a federal claim, since the state court
did enforce "penal" claims under local law, the Court's reasoning
was not dependent upon that fact: 82
[T]he policy of the federal Act is the prevailing policy in every
state.... [A] state court cannot "refuse to enforce the right
arising from the law of the United States because of conceptions of impolicy or want of wisdom on the part of Congress
in having called into play its lawful powers."
These cases, then, may-though on their facts they need notbe taken to mean that the Constitution, presumably through the
Supremacy Clause, directly imposes upon the states an obligation
to enforce federal claims that Congress has not committed to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. Yet it is difficult to perceive the federal interest that justifies so substan.tial an intrusion
upon the power of the states to determine the purposes to be served
by agencies of state government. Article III of the Constitution confers upon Congress the power to establish a federal judicial system
adequate to enforce claims of federal right. In both Mondou and
Testa a federal court was open to the plaintiff, so that a decision
sustaining the refusal to adjudicate would in no way have interfered with the vindication of federal rights. Conceding, therefore,
that a state may not pursue a policy inconsistent with that established by federal law, it is by no means apparent that the state courts
in Mondou and Testa had done so. Federal policy was substantive,
that recovery should be permitted under specified circumstances.
State policy, on the other hand, was concerned only with the use
to be made of state courts, a matter not touched by the federal
policy.
The Court's reliance on the Supremacy Clause appears to come
to no more than it would be unseemly for the state to refuse recognition to rights conferred by federal law-particularly if similar
rights under state law are adjudicated in state courts. In view of
the rather substantial burden that the Court's current doctrine im8 2 /d. at 393. The internal quotation is from Bombolis, supra note 79, where,
however, it was coupled with a limitation to those cases in which the state enforced similat claims under local law.
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poses upon the states, 83 that does not seem an adequate justification.
It is, of course, true that if the states are free to decline jurisdiction
over federal claims and if they exercise that option, the resulting
burden on the federal courts may be extremely heavy. But the allocation of burdens between state and federal judiciaries seems peculiarly a matter for determination by Congress. 84 Recognition of
congressional power to require the exercise of jurisdiction by state
courts would permit ample protection of any federal interests. In
the absence of a declaration by Congress that state courts must
enforce rights that Congress has created, there appears to be no
substantial reason why the Supreme Court should impose such an
obligation. 85
83 The burden is primarily one of numbers. Although statistics on the federal
claims adjudicated in the state courts are not available, the number is undoubtedly
large. See Hart, The Relations between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLuM. L.
REv. 489, 507 n. 55 (1954). Moreover, if Mondou and Testa are extended to the
limits of their rationale, there is a possibiliry of an additional burden, the necessity of administering remedies for which state courts are unprepared.
84 Although congressional power to impose jurisdiction on state courts was
denied as recently as 1944, see Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 188-89 (1944)
(concurring opinion), Testa v. Katt would seem to suggest the contrary. In the
absence of any express limitation upon Congress' power, its authoriry "to make
all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution" its
enumerated powers would appear to provide adequate authoriry. The existence
of such authority might be implied also from the fact that Article III permits,
but does not require, establishment of federal courts inferior to the Supreme
Court, suggesting that Congress was to be free to make use of state judicial systems in the exercise of its powers under Article I.

85 Since the rights involved are based upon Acts of Congress, there is no reason
to fear that Congress would fail to give adequate protection to those rights. Compare discussion in text infra, at notes 86-92. In a few situations, nonetheless, it
might be necessary, if the analysis suggested in the text were to be adopted, to
infer a congressional intent to impose jurisdiction on· the state courts. Under 28
U.S.C. § 1331, a federal district court may not exercise jurisdiction of a case arising
under federal law unless the matter in controversy exceeds $10,000. Other statutes
dispense with the necessiry of this "jurisdictional amount" for most cases arising
under federal law, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1336-40, but a residuum of cases remain
in which federal courts may not exercise original jurisdiction even though the
case arises under a federal statute. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE
DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, Tent. Draft No. 3,
pp. 94--97 (1965). In such cases, the intent of Congress to create a statutory right
without providing a forum being unlikely, an inference that Congress intended
state courts to exercise jurisdiction seems warranted.
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B. ACTIONS AGAINST STATE OFFICIALS-IMPLICATIONS OF
THE CONSTITUTION

Some support for the view that state courts are under a general
obligation to entertain claims arising under federal law is provided
by several cases in which the Court has reviewed a judgment even
though it rested on a determination that under a nondiscriminatory
state rule the state courts lacked power to hear a federal claim
asserted by the plaintiff. In General Oil Co. v. Crain, 86 the state
court, under the compulsion of a statute which, as interpreted, deprived it of jurisdiction over suits against the state or any officer
acting under its authority, declined to hear a suit to enjoin collection of a tax allegedly inconsistent with the Commerce Clause.
The Supreme Court, with only Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting, held
that the state ground of decision was inadequate to preclude review,
apparently on the ground that the state could not constitutionally
refuse to hear the federal claim. The opinion is not, however, explicit about which provision of the Constitution deprived the state
of power to regulate the jurisdiction of its courts. If the obligation
is found in the Supremacy Clause, there would appear to be no
basis for distinction between constitutional and statutory claims;
state courts would be obligated to hear both. In that event, however,
Crain would be inconsistent with Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.
R.R.81
Crain may be read, however, as resting upon the fact that the
plaintiff's claim arose under the Constitution. There is a faint suggestion in the opinion that the state's obligation to provide a remedy
derives not from the Supremacy Clause but as an implication from
the constitutional provision conferring the right. "It being then the
right of a party to be protected against a law which violates a
constitutional right ... it is manifest that a decision which denies
such protection gives effect to the law...." 88 Analytically, there
86

209 U.S. 211 (1908).

87 See

text supra, at note 80.

88 209 U.S. at 228. See also Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U.S. 270 (1884). Cf.
Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276 (1932); Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l
Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931). But cf. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v.
Musgrove, 335 U.S. 900 (1949), in which on facts apparently indistinguishable
from Crain, the Coun dismissed an appeal from a state court "for the reason
that the judgment of the court below is based upon a non-federal ground adequate to support it."
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can be no objection to the implication of a remedy from the provision conferring the right; yet the question remains why the remedy
must be available in a state court. A possible answer to this question
is that if the states are not obligated to provide a remedy, the exercise by Congress of its power to limit the jurisdiction of federal
courts could result in a denial of any remedy for violation of a
constimtional right. 89 Such an analysis would provide a plausible
basis for distinguishing between the obligation of state courts with
respect to statutory and constitutional claims. It would, however,
raise the question whether it is appropriate to fashion constimtional
obligations of state courts on the remote possibility that Congress
may act in a manner destructive of constirutional rights. 90 It is true
that under existing legislation there may be some cases in which
federal courts may not exercise jurisdiction over claims arising under
the Constirution. 91 But the few instances in which Congress has
failed to confer jurisdiction need not lead to a conclusion that state
courts have a general duty to enforce federal constitutional claims.
Exclusion of these cases from the federal courts might reasonably
be read as a direction by Congress that state courts must assume
jurisdiction over them and provide an appropriate remedy. 92
89 A related consideration appears to have had some influence on the Court. In
an obvious reference to the argument for the s1c~te in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908), which was decided the same day as Crain, the Court said: "If a suit
against state officers is precluded in the national courts by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, and may be forbidden by a State to its courts, as it is
contended in the case at bar that it may be, without power of review by this
court, it must be evident that an easy way is open to prevent the enforcement
of many provisions of the Constitution...." 209 U.S. at 226. The argument overlooks the fact that Young rejected the position that the Eleventh Amendment
bars suit in a federal court against a state officer acting under an allegedly unconstitutional authority. Hence, the decision of a state to close the doors of its
own courts to such suits would permit evasion of the Constitution only if Congress also excluded them from the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
On the power of Congress to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts, see
Hart, The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. llEv. 1362, esp. at 1386-1402 (1953).
90 See discussion in text infra, at note 108. But cf. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
1 Wheat. 304, 339 (1816).
91 Most, if not all, of the cases arising under the Constitution which are excluded from 28 U.S.C. § 1331 by reason of the "jurisdictional amount" specified
therein come within 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3), which contains no requirement of a
minimum amount in controversy. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTF, op. cit. supra
note 85, at 95-96.

9 2 See

note 85 supra, and Hart, supra note 89, at 1399.
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C. THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD AND THE OBLIGATION OF THE STATES
TO PROVIDE A POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE

A third line of cases, involving the obligation of the states to
provide a post-conviction remedy for state prisoners, deserves separate consideration. Last Term in Case v. Nebraska,93 certiorari was
granted to consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that states afford state prisoners an adequate corrective process for
the hearing and determination of claims of federal constitutional
infirmity in the proceedings leading to their conviction. Although
the question was avoided in that case, language in previous decisions
strongly supports the conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment
does impose such a requirement. 94 The Court has not, however,
gone beyond a statement of the obligation to an explanation of the
basis upon which it rests. Nor, however frequently it has stated the
obligation, has it ever required that the obligation be fulfilled. The
consistent practice of the Court, on finding that a state provides no
post-conviction remedy, has been to remit prisoners to the federal
district court where federal habeas corpus is available. 95 And, although the writ of habeas corpus extends to a prisoner "in custody
in violation of the Constitution," 96 the issue in the federal court has
always been viewed as the validity of the prisoner's underlying
constitutional claim, not the failure of the state to provide postconviction process.97 If the latter were itself a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it alone would justify a discharge without
the necessity of examining the underlying constitutional claim.98
There is adequate justification, therefore, for the conclusion of one
of our most respecteq state court judges that the Court's statements
in this area ought not to be taken literally.99
Nevertheless, the notion that some post-conviction process must
be afforded has so frequently been expressed by the Court that
93

381 U.S. 336 (1965).

94

See cases collected id. at 343 n. 5 (Brennan, J., concurring).

95

Id. at 343.

96

28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

See, e.g., Hawk v. Hann, 103 F. Supp. 138 (D. Neb. 1952), vacated as moot
and remanded with directions to dismiss, 205 F.2d 839 (8th Cir. 1953).
97

98

Cf. Dowd v. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951).

Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV, L. REv. 1, 16
(1956).
99
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further consideration seems appropriate. The obligation might be
justified on the ground that the states are under a general duty to
provide a forum for claims of federal right. 100 The post-conviction
cases do not, however, appear to rest on so broad a ground. A general duty to adjudicate federal claims would, presumably, flow from
the Supremacy Clause. The obligation with respect to post-conviction process, however, appears to have been raised in the context
of the Fourteenth Amendment and more specifically the Due
Process Clause. 101 The precise question, therefore, is whether a
prisoner incarcerated under a judgment allegedly violative of his
federal constitutional rights is denied due process because of the
state's failure to accord him a hearing on that claim. If the prisoner
has not availed himself of a reasonable opportunity to assert those
rights in the proceedings leading to his conviction, it seems clear
that the state's refusal to afford post-conviction relief does not deny
due process. A consistent line of decisions establishes that a state
court's determination that a federal claimant has chosen an inappropriate remedy under state procedure-in this situation post-conviction relief rather than assertion at trial-is adequate to sustain a
judgment of dismissal.1°2
A more troublesome issue is whether the state must provide postconviction relief when the prisoner has not had a reasonable opportunity to assert his federal rights in the proceedings leading to his
conviction. That issue, on analysis, is an aspect of a broader question: whether a state court must provide an appropriate remedy
when, prior to the suit, it has acted against an individual-by judicial
proceedings or otherwise-in a manner violative of his federal rights
without affording an opportunity for their assertion. An affirmative
answer to that question is suggested by the Court's decision in Ward
v. Love County. 103 In that case the county had coerced the payment
of certain taxes from which the taxpayers were constitutionally
exempt. The state supreme court denied recovery on the ground
that it had no authority under state law to require the county to
repay the taxes when a portion of the taxes had already been paid
100

See discussion in text supra, at notes 69-92.

101 See Case v. Nebraska, note 93 supra, at 338; Taylor
252, 272 (1948) (concurring opinion).
102 See
10a

Comment, 61 CoLuM. L. R.Ev. 255, 261 (1961).

253 U.S. 17 (1920).

v.

Alabama, 335 U.S.
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over by the county to other governmental units. The Supreme
Court reversed, invoking the Fourteenth Amendment: 104
To say that the county could collect these unlawful taxes
by coercive means and not incur any obligation to pay them
back is nothing short of saying that it could take or appropriate the property of these Indian allottees arbitrarily and without due process of law. Of course this would be in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment, which binds the
county as an agency of the state.
A state prisoner asserting that he is imprisoned in violation of his
constitutional rights, under circumstances in which the proceedings
leading to his conviction did not afford an opportunity to present
that claim, is in an analogous position to that of the taxpayer in
Ward v. Love County. In the one case the state has deprived a person of his liberty, in the other of his property, without affording
him an opportunity to be heard in defense against its action.
There are at least two major difficulties with this argument. First,
it proves too much. The "right to be heard" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to federal def enses. 105 Thus, in
Ward v. Love County the Court's conclusion that the state's refusal
of a remedy violated due process did not rest upon the fact that
the taxpayer's defense to the collection of the tax was based upon
federal law. The Supreme Court assuredly has not, however, suggested that a state must afford post-conviction procedures permitting assertion of a violation of a prisoner's rights under state law.
Second, to derive a duty to provide post-conviction procedures
from the right to be heard is merely question-begging. The premise
that a prisoner has a "right to be heard" is merely another way of
saying that the state is under an obligation to provide a post-conviction procedure. The "right" and the "duty," in other words, are
correlative. The question presented by the post-conviction cases is
whether that "right-duty" exists.
The notion that the prisoner has a right to be heard in a state
104

Id. at 24.

105 See, e.g., Central of Georgia Ry. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127 (1907), which
held thai: a state may not, consistently with due process, assess a tax without
affording the taxpayer an opportunity to assert that he is not subject to it, a
proposition which was reaffirmed in Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill,
281 U.S. 673 (1930). Neither case, however, is concerned with the question
whether the state must provide a forum in which the taxpayer may assert and
obtain a remedy for that violation of due process. See id. at 678-79.
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court on his federal claim is derived from a quite different type of
case. If, in a criminal trial, the defendant is denied the opportunity
to present a defense, the denial of due process is clear .106 Reversal
of a conviction by the Supreme Court would be warranted because
the Supremacy Clause requires that when a state undertakes to
adjudicate a controversy it must do so in accordance with applicable
federal law. 107 In the post-conviction cases, by contrast, the state has
not undertaken to adjudicate the controversy.
There is no more compelling reason for imposing on the states
an obligation to provide post-conviction process than there is for
requiring them to adjudicate any other type of federal claim. The
federal interest in the vindication of Fourteenth Amendment rights
is adequately protected by the availability of federal habeas corpus.
Congressional power to limit the availability of that remedy, a
matter which itself raises unresolved constitutional questions, 108 is
surely too slender a reed to support an argument that a state duty
to provide post-conviction relief is necessarily to be implied from
the constitutional provisions establishing rights against the state.
Determination of the effect of a.limitation of the jurisdiction of
federal courts upon the obligation of the states to provide a postconviction remedy must await the event.
In these circumstances, the primary interest served by the provision of adequate corrective processes by the states is not the
federal interest of assuring compliance with the Constitution but
the state interest in retaining control of the administration of criminal justice.109 Whether for that reason or, more laudably, simply
to guard against the possible violation of fundamental rights, there
106 Cf.

Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 417-18 (1897).
Hart, supra note 83, at 507.
lOBSee Oaks, The "Original" Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court, 1962
SUPREME COURT REvmw 153, 155-56; Hart, supra note 89, at 1397-98. Section 14
of the First Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 81-82 (1789), expressly provided that the writ
should not extend "to prisonrrs in gaol, unless they are in custody, under or by
color of the authority of the Jnited States or are committed for trial before some
court of the same, or are net ~ssary to be brought into court to testify," but the
validity of that restriction seems never to have been determined.
100 Under the principles laic' down in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), a
hearing need not be held on a habeas corpus petition if the state has provided adequate corrective process; hence, federal intervention in the administration of criminal justice by the state can be minimized if the state provides its own remedy. On
the question when the state corrective process is adequate to obviate the necessity
of a hearing in the federal court, see Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 78, 104--28 (1964).
107
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is more than sufficient reason for the states to adopt adequate postconviction remedies. no But it is difficult to find in the Due Process
Clause any basis for compelling them to do so. m
In none of the situations that have reached the Court, therefore,
was it necessary, in order to protect the federal interest in the vindication of federal rights, to construe the Constitution as imposing a
self-executing obligation upon the state courts to hear claims arising
under federal law. There may, of course, be other federal interests
served by the state courts' assumption of jurisdiction over federal
claims. In both Henry 112 and Case,ns for example, Mr. Justice
Brennan pointed to a reduction of tensions between state and federal judiciaries as a likely consequence of state court determination
of issues that might be raised in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.
To a lesser extent, that might be true whenever it became necessary
to determine the constitutionality of state action. Initial decision of
the issue by state courts represents an increase in state power, partly
because some cases will never go beyond the state courts and partly
because, even for those that do, the state courts will often be able
significantly to shape the litigation. Beyond mere concern with
ameliorating the possible sensitivity of state officials to federal intervention in the affairs of the state, 114 the exercise of jurisdiction by
state courts allows them to play an important role in the task of
integrating state and federal law, perhaps thereby hastening the
no See Meador, Accommodating State Criminal Procedure and Federal Postconviction Review, 50 A.B.A.J. 928 (1964); Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism,
39 N.Y.U.L.

REV,

945, 957-59 (1964).

1 11

In Case, petitioner's counsel urged the burden which federal habeas imposes
upon the district courts and the friction which the exercise of that jurisdiction
creates as grounds for imposing the obligation of providing a post-conviction remedy on the states. 381 U.S. at 344. The argument is, however, based on the assumption that the states are constitutionally required to provide corrective process and
that the only question before the Court is whether it will enforce that obligation
or continue to rely solely on federal habeas corpus. Brief for the Petitioner, pp. 30-38.
If that premise falls, as suggested previously, the argument falls with it since it can
hardly serve as independent basis for imposing the duty on the states.
112
114

379 U.S. at 452-53.

ns 381 U.S. at 344--47.

The attempt to formulate doctrine on the basis of a supposed reaction of
state officials to federal intervention is hazardous at best. As Professor Amsterdam
has recently suggested, it is at least plausible that federal intervention after a state
court determination is more of an irritant to state judges than intervention at an
earlier stage before state courts become deeply involved in the proceedings. See
Amsterdam, supra note 13, at 835-36,
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acceptance of federal law. 115 But the ability of the Court to contribute to a reduction of the friction resulting from the state's irritation over federal intervention in its aff airs is limited to affording
the state an opportunity to exercise jurisdiction over federal
claims.11 6 It can hardly achieve that goal by commanding the state
to assume jurisdiction.117
D. INADEQUACY OTHER THAN CONSTITUTIONAL

Since the Supreme Court may not itself try the underlying federal
claim, it normally will be required to choose between two positions
when asked to review a judgment resting upon a state court's refusal to adjudicate. The refusal may be held unconstitutional, thereby imposing an obligation on the state court to try the case on
remand, or the Court may hold the refusal permissible, thereby
denying its own jurisdiction. Occasionally, however, a case may
arise in which the Court is not limited to these alternatives. Such
cases raise the question whether the state court's refusal to adjudicate may be inadequate to preclude review even though the refusal
is not constitutionally infirm. Analysis of the constitutional obligation of state courts to afford a forum and a remedy for federal
claims demonstrates that the traditional justification for a determination of inadequacy, the need to assure that rulings on state law
do not interfere unduly with the vindication of federal rights, is
not a factor in these cases. Other justifications for asserting jurisdiction may exist, however.
In Liner v. Jafco, lnc., 118 a state trial court, rejecting a defense
of federal preemption, enjoined peaceful picketing at a construction
site. The state supreme court affirmed on the dual grounds that the
preemption defense had been properly rejected and that the cause
had become moot by reason of the completion of construction pend115

Jd. at 830-31.

11 6

See, e.g., Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S.

241 (1886).
11 7 Situations may be imagined in which the refusal of a state court to ad judicate a federal claim poses special problems, as where the state's refusal is announced for the first time in a case that would be time-barred if a new proceeding
in a federal court were to be required. Cf. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
Solution of such problems is not likely to be beyond the Court's ingenuity. See
Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965).

m 375 U.S. 301 (1964).
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ing appeal. Without intimating that the latter, non-federal ground
of decision was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court nonetheless
held that it was inadequate to preclude review. 119 The issues were
not moot, in the Court's view, because the defendant's right to
recover on an injunction bond that had been required depended
upon whether the injunction was wrongfully issued, a question that
turned solely on federal law.
The justification for the Court's re-examination of what was
plainly a matter of state law-the power of a state appellate court
to consider an appeal it deemed moot-is far from clear. An analysis
of the decision suggests that the Court's assumption of jurisdiction
can be justified only by its desire to render an "advisory opinion"
on the power of state courts to issue an injunction under the circumstances of the case. Acceptance of the state court's resolution
of the mootness question would in no way have interfered with the
vindication of the defendant's federal rights. As the case reached the
Court, defend ants had not yet attempted to recover on the bond.
If at some later date they were to make such an attempt, the federal
issue would still have been open for determination by the Courr. 120
The only purpose served by the Court's decision on the merits,
therefore, was a clarification of federal law, partly for the potential
benefit of the defendants at some later time, but more importantly
for the education of state courts in connection with future and unrelated litigation. There is much in the Court's opinion, indeed, to
indicate that the latter purpose was salient in its decision to treat
the state ground as inadequate. 121 The only practical consequence
119 See also Love v. Griffith, 266 U.S. 32 (1924), affirming a state court determination of mootness, but asserting the Court's power to treat such a determination
as inadequate. But cf. Cramp v. Baaed of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 281
(1961).
120 The Court's contrary assertion, that if the state court's determination of
the federal "question may not be challenged here, the petitioners have no recourse
against Jafco on the bond," 375 U.S. at 306, is plainly incorrect. If the federal
issue were open in a subsequent state court proceeding on the bond, the Court's
jurisdiction would be clear. Even if the state court were to treat the propriety
of the injunction as foreclosed in a later proceeding, however, the power of the
Court to consider the question at that time is well settled. See, e.g., New York
Central R.R. v. New York and Pennsylvania Co., 271 U.S. 124 (1926).
1 21 "It would encourage such interference with the federal agency's exclusive
jurisdiction if a state court's holding of mootness based on the chance event of
completion of construction barred this Court's review of the state court's adverse
decision on the claim of federal preemption." 375 U.S. at 307.
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of an explicit admission by the Court that its decision to review
rested on that ground would have been the entry of a more appropriate order. Reversal and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion, the order actually handed down by
the Court, seems inappropriate in view of the fact that there appears
to have been nothing in the Court's opinion that would require the
state court to modify its original judgment. Accordingly, the state
court's judgment might more appropriately have been left undisturbed.

V.

ADJUDICATIONS INCONSISTENT WITH FEDERAL RIGHTS

In the situations considered thus far, discharge of the Court's
responsibility for the protection of federal rights does not require a
re-examination of non-federal grounds upon which the judgment
may have rested: rights conferred by federal law are either protected by the judgment or, if the state has declined to adjudicate
the controversy in which the federal claim is asserted, a federal forum for the assertion of those rights is available. But when a state
court has undertaken to adjudicate a controversy and, though resting on a non-federal ground, has entered a judgment allegedly inconsistent with federal law, a re-examination of the non-federal
ground by the Supreme Court is inescapable. "To hold otherwise,"
as Mr. Justice Holmes once wrote, "would open an easy method
of avoiding the jurisdiction of [the] court." 122
The Court's power to re-examine state grounds supporting a
judgment allegedly inconsistent with federal law serves the additional purpose of permitting it to exercise final authority for ·the
accommodation of interests required in the integration of state and
federal law. State and federal law are complexly interrelated: federal law may protect legal relationships created by the state, 123 or
confer immunity from state law, 124 or otherwise regulate the exer1 22 Terre Haute & I. R.R. v. Indianapolis ex rel. Ketcham, 194 U.S. 579, 589
(1904).

1 2 3 See, e.g., Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938) (Contract
Clause protects obligation defined by state law); Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 274 U.S. 651 (1927) (Fourteenth Amendment protects property as defined by state law) .
1 24 See, e.g., Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920) (federal statute confers
immunity from state taxation).
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cise of state power. 125 State law may be urged in avoidance of a
federal claim, 126 and adherence to state procedure may have an
effect upon the substance of federal law. 127 The resting of a judgment upon a state ground, in the face of a claim that the effect of
the judgment is to deny rights conferred by federal law, necessarily
involves some accommodation of state and federal interests. 128
Nevertheless, a re-examination of the state ground does not, as one
commentator has suggested, make of the Court merely "one more
court of appeals weighing factors of decision already judicially
considered." 129 The Court's power to declare the state ground inadequate exploits the institutional differences between it and the
state courts to assure that in the accommodation of state and federal
interests appropriate recognition will be given to the latter. In view
of the fundamental values embodied in the constitutional limitations
on state power, with which we are primarily concerned at this
point, and the deliberate decision in the constitutional convention to
accord supremacy to federal law, that power seems amply justified.
Criteria for determining adequacy must, therefore, serve two
purposes. First, they must assure that the Court will be able to exercise jurisdiction in at least a . high proportion of those cases in
which a state ground is put forth with the intent to avoid a claim
of federal right. Second, they must strike an appropriate balance
between state and federal interests.
Recognition of the first purpose has led to the recurrent suggestion that a determinatio,n of adequacy involves an inquiry into the
question whether the non-federal ground was put forth with the
intent of evading the federal claim. 130 At the outset, it seems plain
125

See generally, Hart, supra note 83, at 515-25.

126 See, e.g., Enterprise Irr. Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157 (1917)
(estoppel to assert denial of due process); Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17
(1920) (voluntary payment claimed to avoid federal immunity from state taxation).
121 See, e.g., American Ry. Exp. Co. v. Levee, 263 U.S. 19 (1923) (burden of
proof).

12s In Henry, for example, the decision of the state court to rest affirmance of
the conviction on the failure of Henry's counsel to interpose a timely objection
necessarily involved a determination that compliance with state procedure was
paramount to protection of a criminal defendant from the possibility of conviction upon unlawfully seized evidence.
120

Note, supra note 10, at 1393.

1ao See, e.g., RoBERTSON & K1aKHAM, op. cit. supra note 9, at
cited therein.

§ 96,

and cases
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that a determination of inadequacy is not dependent upon an affirmative conclusion to such an inquiry. Inadequacy has been found not
only in its absence 131 but in cases in which the circumstances do not
suggest intentional evasion. 132 A contrary doctrine would unduly
limit the Court's power to protect claims of federal right by insulating from review state decisions resting on non-federal grounds
which unjustifiably burden the assertion of such claims. 133 Moreover,
the inevitable reluctance of the Court to find, except in the most
extreme cases, that state judges had in effect violated their oaths of
office 134 would result in an almost total insulation of state grounds
from review.
There are equally persuasive objections to treating a finding of
intent to deprive a litigant of his federal rights as one of the tests for
adequacy. 135 Inquiry into the intent of a state court is sufficiently
hazardous and the likely results of such doubtful utility that it
ought not to be undertaken. The difficulties are amply demonstrated
by Henry. Petitioner's counsel urged136 that the change in the state
decision was influenced by a statement in the Brief in Support of
the Suggestion of Error of the affiliation of petitioner and his counsel with the NAACP. 137 In view of the apparent mistake of fact
underlying the state court's first opinion, that inference is hardly
compelling; yet, if the issue before the Court were the factual one
whether the state court had the impermissible intent, the inference
is surely not so unreasonable that it could have been rejected out
of hand. If an inquiry into the "intent" of the state court is to be
131 See, e.g., Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276 (1932); American
Ry. Exp. Co. v. Levee, 263 U.S. 19 (1923).
132 See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 376 U.S. 339 (1964), discussed in
text infra, at notes 199-204.
133 See discussion in text infra, at notes 166-78, 198-211.
134 U.S. CONST., art. VI.
135 Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting in Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 399 (1955),
suggested the following formulation: "A purported state ground is not independent and adequate in two instances. First, where the circumstances give rise
to an inference that the state court is guilty of an evasion-an interpretation of state
law with the specific intent to deprive a litigant of a federal right. Second, where
the state law, honestly applied though it may be, and even dictated by the precedents, throws such obstacles in the way of enforcement of federal rights that it
must be struck down as unreasonably interfering with the vindication of such
rights."
136 See Petition for Certiorari, p. 22; Brief for Petitioner, p. 36.
187 See note 21 supra.
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undertaken, what weight is to be given the intimation that, in
writing its first opinion, it may already have been aware of petitioner's participation in the civil rights movement? 138 Or, on the other
hand, what weight is to be given to the fact that the second opinion
substantially narrowed the state court's interpretation of a prior
case defining the circumstances under which an appeal would be
permitted notwithstanding failure to make timely objection? 139 In
short, a determination of the intent with which the state ground of
decision was put forward cannot be made on the basis of the materials normally available to the Court. 140
The notion that the adequacy vel non of a state ground requires
a determination in each case of the intent with which it has been
put forth is, therefore, only a fiction, and not a particularly useful
one.14 1 A more appropriate inquiry would focus upon the establishment of workable criteria-applicable without reference to the
unascertainable intent in particular cases-for distinguishing nonfederal grounds that ought to preclude Supreme Court review of
federal questions from those that should not. The difficulty of establishing intent in a particular case does not, of course, require that
in formulating criteria the Court ought to ignore the possibility of
intentional evasion of federal rights by state court judges. Jurisdiction to review state court judgments has, from the very beginning,
been justified in part upon the basis that it was necessary to protect
against the potential hostility of state judges to federal rights. 142
More recent history does not inspire confidence that such concern
is no longer necessary. The criteria, however, ought to be stated in
terms susceptible of objective measurement.
A. CONSISTENCY WITH EARLIER DECISIONS

The Court traditionally has placed substantial weight on whether
the non-federal ground put forth by the state court is consistent
See note 19 supra.
See text supra, at notes 19-22.
140 The only exceptions are the extremely rare situations in which state law
in terms discriminates against federal rights. See, e.g., McKnett v. St. Louis &
S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934); Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 223 U.S.
1 (1912).
141 Few doctrines would be more destructive of harmonious relationships between federal and state judiciaries than one which requires the Supreme Coun
to inquire into the good faith of state judges.
142 See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 346-47 (1816).
138

139
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with its earlier decisions. 143 A test of consistency serves several purposes, depending somewhat on the context in which it is employed.
Initially, however, it serves generally as a fairly reliable discriminator. When a state ground of decision is supported by a history of
consistent application, even in cases that do not involve a federal
claim, it is not likely to have been used by the state court simply
as a device to defeat the Court's jurisdiction. The converse, of
course, is not necessarily true. A non-federal ground departing from
previous state authority may have been put forth for wholly innocent purposes. Nevertheless, the risk that it was put forward for an
illicit purpose is sufficiently substantial that the Court may be justified in treating it as inadequate.
The danger, of course, is that the Court will unwarrantedly interfere with the power of the state court to formulate state law. But
that danger is not great in view of the minimal interference with
state interests resulting from the determination of inadequacy. If
the determination rests solely upon inconsistency with earlier state
decisions, the state will be able to apply its new rule to future litigation. The effect of the determination, therefore, is limited to the
case at hand and though that may be a matter of some moment to
the state, its primary interest, control over the ongoing definition
of state law, is respected.
In most situations, moreover, inconsistency with earlier decisions
will be significant for reasons other than as an indicator that the
state court has attempted to defeat a federal right by evasion of the
Court's jurisdiction. For example, when federal law protects interests created by state law, the non-federal issue concerns the content of state law at a time prior to the litigation.14 4 A state court's
redefinition of the state right may effectively frustrate that protection, whether or not it was put forward in an attempt to evade the
Court's jurisdiction. Other considerations support a determination
of inadequacy when the state ground represents a departure from
previously settled rules of procedure. In such cases, the effect of the
new procedural ruling may be to deny any opportunity for the
143 Compare Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964), with Wolfe v.
North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177 (1960), and Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303
U.S. 95 (1938), with Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Cornm'n, 274 U.S. 651
(1927). See generally, Note, supra note 10 at 1385; Comment, supra note 102,
at 264-72.
144

See

HART

& WECHSLER, op. cit. supra nDte 71, at 466.
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assertion of federal rights. 145 In either event due regard for federal
rights requires that the Court review the state judgment undeterred
by the fact that it rests upon a non-federal ground.
Departures from previous authority do not, typically, involve an
explicit overruling of earlier decisions. The state court or counsel
for the prevailing party may be able to present a plausible argument
for reconciling the non-federal ground of decision and earlier decisions allegedly inconsistent with it. In such cases, the Court must
determine how much deference is to be given the state court. The
answer, it seems, ought to depend upon the context in which the
problem is presented. Opinions in cases involving federal protection
of rights created by state law have, at least verbally, manifested
substantial deference. Where the state ground concerns the existence of a contract obligation, for example, the Court has said that
it accords "respectful consideration and great weight to the views
of the State's highest court" 146 or, even more deferentially, that it
leans "toward agreement with the courts of the state, and accept[s]
their judgment as to such matters unless manifestly wrong." 147 The
effect of such deference is to allow the state court considerable leeway: its determination with respect to the existence and meaning
of the contract will stand if it can plausibly be reconciled with
previous authority. Since, in this area, federal law attempts only to
protect a justified reliance on rights conferred by the state, the
allowance of that leeway is appropriate. Unless the earlier state law
relied upon by the federal claimant has crystallized to the point that
it must be overruled or can be distinguished only on tenuous
145 The Court has held on at least one occasion that such a ruling constitutes
a denial of due process. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S.
673 (1930). See also Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354-55 (1964). More
frequently, however, it has merely declared the procedural ruling inadequate to
preclude its review. See, e.g., Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964);
N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); Wright v. Georgia,
373 U.S. 284 (1963); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958);
Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958).
More than a technical distinction is involved. If the application of a new procedural rule that forecloses a claim is treated as a denial of due process, rights
under state law are protected equally with federal rights.

146 Indiana

ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938).

Hale v. State Board, 302 U.S. 95, 101 (1937). Deference has also been expressed with respect to the question whether state law recognizes a property
interest for which Founeenth Amendment protection is sought. See, e.g., Broad
River Power Co. v. South Carolina ex rel. Daniel, 281 U.S. 537, 540 (1930) (state
coun's determination must be upheld if it rests on "a fair or substantial basis"}.
147
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grounds, the normal leeways in our legal system are such that reliance on it is not justified. 148
A similar degree of deference will normally be inappropriate
when the state ground of decision involves an arguable departure
from previously established procedural rules. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson149 teaches that a novel state procedural rule
that bars consideration of a federal claim ought not to be treated
as adequate merely because it can be reconciled with previous state
authority. In that case the state court refused to review a contempt
conviction on the ground that the wrong appellate procedure had
been employed. Language in earlier state opinions indicated that the
procedure used was permissible, but the state urged that those cases
were distinguishable. The state ground was nonetheless held inadequate because, even if in retrospect there appeared to be a consistent pattern of procedure to obtain appellate review, "petitioner
could not fairly be deemed to have been apprised of its existence." 150
N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson may be read narrowly
to mean that a local procedural rule barring assertion of a federal
claim will be held inadequate only if it appears that the federal
claimant may have been affirmatively misled by prior decisions151
or it may be read more broadly as requiring a determination of inadequacy whenever the state has failed to provide notice of the
requirement. The former reading is suggested by an earlier decision,
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill,1 52 in which the Court
said that where procedure was prescribed by an uninterpreted
statute a federal claimant would have "to assume the risk that the
ultimate interpretation by the [state's] highest court might differ
from its own." 153 Nevertheless, if the Court determines that a federal claimant has reasonably interpreted earlier state law, the differ148 In Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 64 (1938), involving the obligation of a
state under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to enforce a judgment rendered by
another state, the Court suggested that it re-examines "with deference" the nonfederal ground of the effect which the latter state would accord the judgment.
On that issue, however, the basis for a display of deference is far from clear. The
Court is after all, as competent as the state coun to ascertain the law of another
state. See HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 71, at 469-70.
149

357 U.S. 449 (1958).

150

Id. at 457.

1 5 1 Thus, immediately following the statement quoted in the text, the Court
referred to petitioner's "justified reliance on prior decisions.. , ." Ibid.
152

281 U.S. 673 (1930).

153

/d. at 682 n. 9.
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ing interpretation by the state court should not preclude review
even though it also is reasonable. Due recognition of the supremacy
of federal law would seem to require at least that a reasonable opportunity for its assertion be made available. When the state refuses
to hear the federal claim because of a procedural rule of which it
did not afford adequate notice, that opportunity has not been provided.154
These considerations are relevant, however, only when the state
procedural rule is of a character to induce reliance on the part of
the litigants. Not all procedural rules are of that character and more
deference to the state court's attempt to reconcile its decision with
previous authority may be appropriate where the procedural rule
involved is not one on which the federal claimant may reasonably
be deemed to have relied. The state supreme court's first opinion in
Henry, it will be recalled, indicated that when fundamental rights
were involved, state law recognized an exception to the rule that
errors to which timely objection had not been made were foreclosed on appeal. 155 In its second opinion, however, the earlier decision which had established the rule was interpreted as resting upon
the incompetence of trial counsel, a factor not present in Henry .156
An examination of the earlier decision indicates that either reading
is permissible. 157 Since Henry's counsel were not likely to have re154 In Brinkerhoff-Faris, the Court was concerned with due process, not simply
the adequacy of a state ground to preclude its own review of a federal question.
Since a decision on due process grounds would protect state rights adversely
affected by the state procedure as well as federal rights, see note 145 supra, a
test more restrictive than that suggested in the text may well have been appropriate.
156 See text supra; at notes 20--2 I.
155 See text supra, at note 20.
157 See Brooks v. State, 209 Miss. 150 (1950). In two previous cases cited in
Mr. Justice Black's concurring opinion, Carter v. State, 198 Miss. 523 (1945), and
Fisher v. State, 145 Miss. 116 (1926), the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed
for error that had not been appropriately challenged at trial without any suggestion of the incompetence of trial counsel. These cases, however, are distinguishable from Henry in that the errors involved, the capacity of the defendant
to stand trial and the admissibility of a coerced confession, were relevant to the
integrity of the trial process, a claim which cannot be made concerning the alleged
error in Henry. See discussion in text infra, at notes 205-07. Although the state
court did not mention these decisions in its second Henry opinion, the ground
upon which they can be distinguished is sufficiently close to the ground on which
the Brooks decision was distinguished that it would be difficult to argue that the
refusal to hear Henry's objection on appeal was inadequate simply on the basis
of inconsistency with earlier decisions. At most, the earlier cases indicated, as Mr.
Justice Black argued, that the state court had discretion to consider errors not
appropriately raised at trial. See discussion in text infra, at notes 15~2.
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lied on the exception and since the basis for the distinction is more
than adequate to preclude suggestion of an inconsistency indicative
of hostility to federal rights, it would seem that Henry was not an
appropriate case for finding inadequacy simply on the basis of inconsistency with earlier decisions.
The earlier decision did, however, establish that the state supreme
court had power to consider objections not timely raised at trial.
Accordingly, refusal to consider Henry's constitutional claim may,
as Mr. Justice Black contended, be viewed as involving the exercise
of discretion. The adequacy of a discretionary determination to
refuse consideration of a federal claim to prevent the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Supreme Court has occasioned some confusion
in the past. Earlier decisions may be read as holding that such a
determination is adequate if it is consistent with the exercise of
discretion in other cases. 158 In that event, the fact that the state
court has discretion adds nothing to the analysis, since consistency
with previous cases is a relevant test of adequacy even if the state
court purported not to have discretion. Some support may be found,
however, for the broader proposition that the very existence of
discretion in the state court requires a determination of inadequacy.159 Since state courts commonly exercise discretionary authority to waive procedural irregularities in the interest of justice, the
existence of such authority, under the latter approach, would be of
substantial significance. A conclusion that the state court's power
to waive procedural irregularity permits the Court to assume jurisdiction, even though the state court has not exercised the power,
might be supported on several grounds. Initially, the existence of the
power suggests that no vital state interest is at stake. If some deviations from regular procedure can be tolerated, a few more can
hardly be seriously disruptive. Moreover, it might be thought inappropriate for the state court to pick and choose among federal
rights, deciding that only some were sufficiently important that a
failure to raise them properly under state procedure ought to be
excused. Finally, even if some such discrimination among federal
rights is deemed appropriate, the power ought to rest in the Supreme
168See Wolfe v. Nonh Carolina, 364 U.S. 177, 191 (1960).
See Shuttleswonh v. City of Birmingham, 376 U.S. 339 (1964); Williams v.
Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1955). Wi/Jiams may be read more narrowly as
requiring a determination of inconsistency with earlier cases. See 349 U.S. at 383.
lH
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Court as the judicial body ultimately responsible for the accommodation of state and federal law.
Assessment of these arguments requires a closer examination of
the discretion exercised by state courts. Discretion, the power to
choose among alternatives, may be either what Professors Hart and
Sacks have termed "a power of reasoned elaboration" or "a power
of continuing discretion." 160 The latter connotes "ad hocness"a power to decide one way on one occasion and differently on
another without obligation for explanation. Not surprisingly, in
view of the general postulates of our judicial system, neither Henry
nor any of the other cases that have reached the Court is of this
type. 161 Each involved discretion in the former sense. In that sense,
however, discretion is nothing more than the judicial formulation
of law. The latitude of choice, the recognition of an obligation for
reasonable consistency and of the obligation to explain the decision,
including the reason for according different treatment to the instant
case and those previously decided, is the same whether the state
court casts its decision in terms of discretion or in terms of a limitation on its power. Insofar as discretion involves "a power of reasoned elaboration," the conclusion of a state court that it lacks
power to waive noncompliance with procedural rules, except
under specified circumstances, is for present purposes the equivalent
of a statement that it will exercise a discretionary power to waive
noncompliance only under those circumstances. 162 Neither the intensity of the state's interest, the propriety of discrimination among
federal rights, nor the Supreme Court's ultimate authority for accommodating state and federal law is affected by the formulation
adopted by the state court to express what it has done.
160 HART

&

SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND

PLICATION OF LAw

AP-

161, 168-79 (tentative ed. 1958).

161 But cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,533, 556-59 (1953) (dissenting opinions).
Mr. Justice Black's statement in Henry, that he would not allow petitioner's constitutional rights to "be cut off irrevocably by state-court discretionary rulings
which might be different in particular undefined circumstances in other cases,"
379 U.S. at 457, suggests that he perhaps viewed Henry as a case involving a
"power of continuing discretion." That view is difficult to reconcile with the
state court's reasoned distinction between Henry and its earlier cases.
162 Nor does it seem relevant that limitations on the state court's power are
defined by legislation rather than self-imposed. Whether a state acts by its legislature, its executive, or its judiciary, is generally a matter of indifference under
federal law. See, e.g., Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902).
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B. THE ACCOMMODATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAW

Although consistency with previous decision has been an important determinant of adequacy, there is no doubt that an inquiry into
consistency does not describe the reach of the Court's power to reexamine state grounds put forth in support of a judgment that fails
to recognize a claimed federal right. In part, the exercise of a broader power is necessary to guard against the possible hostility of state
courts to federal rights. A federal right may be avoided by state
grounds that lack a foundation in the record as well as by those
that depart from earlier law. The Court has, in consequence, consistently asserted its power to review the factual basis for the state
ground. 163
When the state ground is unrelated to the asserted federal right,164
a determination that it accords with previous state authority and
that it is supported by the record should be sufficient to establish
its adequacy. In such a case, the only justification for re-examination
of the state ground is to guard against the possibility that it was put
forward merely to defeat the federal right. A similar restriction
on the Court's inquiry is appropriate when the state ground concerns the existence of a state right for which federal protection is
claimed. Consistency with previous state authority and a foundation
in the record are sufficient to safeguard against the potential hostility of state courts to federal rights and to protect the reliance with
which federal guarantees are concerned. 165
When, on the other hand, state law purports to regulate the
circumstances under which federal rights may be establishedeither by recognition of defenses based upon pre-litigation conduct
or by procedural doctrines-a determination of adequacy requires
a more searching inquiry by the Court. In such cases, the Court's
concerns are not limited to the potential hostility of state courts
to federal rights or to the effect which a frustrated reliance on state
163 See, e.g., Ancient Egyptian Order v. Michaux, 279 U.S. 737 (1929); Creswill
v. Knights of Pythias, 225 U.S. 246 (1912).
164 See, e.g., Leathe v. Thomas, 207 U.S. 93 (1907) (state court's allowance of
set-off adequate to preclude review of claim that full faith and credit had not been
given to judgment on which suit was based); Chapman v. Goodnow, 123 U.S. 540
(1887) (state court's judgment allegedly inconsistent with earlier decree of Supreme
Court adequately supported by finding of liability distinct from that involved in
original proceeding before Supreme Court).
165

See text supra, at notes 143-48.
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law may have on the vindication of federal rights. It must assure
also that state law, though evenly applied, does not unduly burden
federal rights. 166
As an original proposition, it might be argued that defenses to a
federal right or the avoidance of a federal defense raise questions of
federal law. The Court has not followed that path. Numerous decisions sustain as an adequate non-federal ground a determination
that under state law the pre-litigation conduct of the federal claimant resulted in a loss of his federal rights. 167 Yet, the Court has not
hesitated to declare such grounds inadequate, not only for inconsistency with earlier state law or insufficient support in the record,
but because they cut too deeply into rights conferred by federal
law. 168 A similar power has been asserted by the Court in connection
with state procedural doctrines. When a state rule, though denominated procedural, narrows the protection afforded by federal
law-as, for example, by placing the burden of proof on the federal
claimant169-justification for displacement of the state rule is precisely the same as in the cases holding a state substantive ground
inadequate. In all such cases, it seems fair to conclude, the accommodation of state and federal law is dictated by the Supremacy
Clause. The state ground is not independent of the federal right;
the policy it expresses is in conflict with federal policy and, therefore, may not be given effect.
The Supremacy Clause provides a less certain answer with respect to the adequacy of state grounds that do not purport to limit
the rights conferred by federal law, but merely to establish the
manner in which they are to be presented to and determined by the
state court. A variety of factors support federal respect for procedural rules of this type. Generally, they do not express a policy
at variance with the substance of the claimed federal right170 and,
if they are evenly applied, there is no need for concern about hos166 See

note 135 supra.

See, e.g., Utley v. St. Petersburg, 292 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1934) (!aches); Enterprise Irr. Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157 (1917) (estoppel).
167

168 See, e.g., MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402 (1947);
Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765 (1931); Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67 (1918).
169
1 70

See, e.g., American Ry. Exp. Co. v. Levee, 263 U.S. 19 (1923).

When federal policy extends to the procedure by which the federal claim is
to be determined, a state that undertakes to adjudicate that claim must, of course,
respect that policy. Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
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tility to federal rights. Further, distribution of authority between
the federal government and the states might be thought to require
that, so long as these conditions and constitutional standards of
fairness are satisfied, states ought to be free to define the procedures
by which their courts are to be operated. There is, however, another dimension to the problem. Emphasis upon the distribution
of power in a federal system ought not to obscure the fact that
deference to state procedures will sometimes result in frustration
of imponant federal policies. The tendency of our legal system for
more than a century has been toward securing the disposition of
lawsuits on the merits. A determination of the adequacy of state
procedural grounds requires some consideration of the extent to
which the Coun ought to permit a state's imperviousness to this
tendency, either generally or in panicular instances, to affect the
enforcement of federal policy.
1. The traditional approach. In general, the Court has held that
state law determines "the time when and the mode by which federal
claims must be asserted and preserved." 171 And a state court's refusal to consider a feckral claim because of the claimant's failure to
comply with such rules has frequently been treated as an adequate
state ground.172 Nevertheless, when state courts have applied local
procedural rules with pointless severity to foreclose consideration
of federal claims, the Court has on occasion held the state ground .
inadequate for that reason. 173 The principle stated by the majority
in Henry, "that a litigant's procedural defaults in state proceedings
do not prevent vindication of his federal rights unless the State's
insistence on compliance with its procedural rules serves a legitimate
state interest," 174 is therefore, amply supported by previous case
law. Viewed as an accommodation of state and federal interests,
171 HART

& WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 71, at 500.

172 See, e.g., Wolfe v. Nonh Carolina, 364 U.S. 177 (1960); Pennsylvania R.R. v.
Illinois Brick Co., 297 U.S. 447 (1936); Central Union Co. v. Edwardsville, 269 U.S.

190 (1925).
11a Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22
(1923); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904). See also, N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama
ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963); Staub
v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958). Although the determination of inadequacy
in each of the last three c~es rested in part on other grounds, such as inconsistency
with previous state authority, the Coun appears to have been influenced in each by
a belief that to require adherence to the state procedure ''would be to force reson
to an arid ritual of meaningless form." 355 U.S. at 320.
174

379 U.S. at 447.
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moreover, the principle is unexceptionable. If no state interest is
served by requiring adherence to the state procedure, the sacrifice
of federal rights plainly is not justified.
It is only the aberrant case, however, that involves a procedural
rule that serves no legitimate state interest. The important question
is whether, assuming that the rule is supported by permissible state
policies, the Court ought to permit a loss of federal rights to result
from a procedural default. Decisions before Henry consistently answered that question in the affirmative. Moreover, if the procedural
rule invoked by the state court is one generally supported by state
policy, the Court's tendency has been to avoid close scrutiny of
whether the policy is served by invoking the rule in the particular
case. 175 The resulting doctrine comes to this: a state procedural rule
that bars assertion of a federal right will be adequate to deprive the
Court of jurisdiction if the rule is evenly applied, 176 serves a legitimate state interest, and (assuming the rule is of a character to induce reliance) has been clearly announced in earlier decisions. 177
Such a doctrine permits the state courts to exercise primary responsibility for accommodating relevant state and federal law. In
effect, the power of the state to require adherence to its established
procedure is treated as paramount in importance to the protection
of federal rights. Even if it is conceded that that may sometimes be
appropriate, 178 the general importance of federal rights and the
supremacy of federal law suggest that it is unlikely that such deference to state procedure is always appropriate. Nor is there any
apparent reason for conferring upon state courts the ultimate responsibility for striking a balance between federal policies and the
state's interest in the integrity of its procedures. Insofar as state
policies impinge upon federal policies, ultimate responsibility for
their accommodation is normally exercised by the Supreme Court.
2. The impact of Fay v. Noia. Continued adherence to the Court's
traditional approach to determining the adequacy of state procedural grounds is, additionally, more than a little anomalous in view
of the decision in Fay v. Noia. 179 In Fay the Court rejected the
175 See, e.g., Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177 (1960); Parker v. Illinois, 333
U.S. 571 (1948).
176 See

discussion in text supra, at notes 143--45.

177 See

discussion in text supra, at notes 149-54.

178 See

text infra, at notes 205-11.
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372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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position that a state procedural ground adequate to deprive it of
jurisdiction on direct review was also a bar to the exercise of habeas
corpus jurisdiction by the district courts. It held that a state prisoner
claiming a constitutional infirmity in the proceedings leading to
his conviction could be denied relief only if he had deliberately
bypassed orderly state procedure for the presentation of that
claim. 180 In the limited area which it affects-state criminal proceedings-Fay thus strikes a balance between state and federal interests
which is quite inconsistent with that struck by the Court's traditional approach to determining the adequacy of state grounds to
preclude its own jurisdiction. In effect, Fay represents a determination that protection of federal rights-at least in criminal cases-is
paramount to the interests served by the state's insistence on a litigant's adherence to established procedure, a determination diametrically opposed to that which underlies the traditional adequate state
ground doctrine. The extent of the anomaly is demonstrated by the
fact, noted by the Court in Henry, that even if it had held the state
court's refusal to consider Henry's constitutional claim adequate to
preclude its own jurisdiction, the claim would have been open in a
federal habeas corpus proceeding unless the district court were to
determine that Henry had deliberately bypassed the state procedure.181
To suggest the necessity of a redefinition of the adequacy of state
procedural grounds to foreclosure review of claimed federal rights
because of the decision in Fay is not without irony. Several years
before Fay was decided, Professor Hart had suggested that state
grounds adequate to prevent the Court from taking jurisdiction or
direct review ought also to be a bar to the assertion of habeas corpus
jurisdiction. 182 In rejecting that position both the majority in Fay,
and Professor Reitz in his influential article preceding that decision, 183 were at pains to distinguish habeas corpus from direct review
for the purpose of demonstrating that doctrines limiting the Court's
jurisdiction in the latter situation were not controlling in the former. And yet, the arguments advanced for rejecting the limitation
on habeas corpus jurisdiction proposed by Professor Hart appear,
on examination, to be equally applicable to direct review.
1so Id. at 438-39.
183 Reitz, Federal

181 379 U.S. at 452.

182 Hart, supra note 8, at 118-19.

Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74

HARV. L. REv. 1315 (1961).

180

TERRANCE SANDALOW

Both the Court and Professor Reitz, for example, condemned the
exaltation of procedure over substance that would result from denying relief to a prisoner claiming violation of his constitutional rights
merely because of a failure to comply with state procedure. 184 But
that is as much a consequence of the Court's traditional approach to
determining the adequacy of state procedural grounds to foreclose
review as it would have been a consequence of importing the adequate state ground doctrine into habeas corpus. In both situationsas the Court and Professor Reitz argued in connection with habeas
corpus-a litigant in a state proceeding is unlikely to forgo compliance with state procedure, thereby losing the opportunity for a
determination of the federal claim by the state courts, merely because a federal court may at some later date provide a remedy for
the federal claim. To do so would not only ignore the risk that the
federal claim might be overlooked in the flood of applications for
federal relief but would ignore the advantage of having that claim
passed on by state courts as well as federal. In both situations, moreover, a doctrine permitting forfeiture of constitutional rights because of a failure to comply with state procedures will weigh heavily
on those whose only fault is inadvertence or neglect. If the state's
interest in requiring adherence to its procedures is insufficient to bar
habeas corpus, it is difficult to see why it is sufficient to bar direct
review.
The Court's opinion in Fay suggests, however, that there are technical reasons, inapplicable to habeas corpus, that prevent it from
asserting jurisdiction over state court judgments that rest on state
procedural grounds. 185 Unfortunately, the precise nature of the
technical distinctions is not articulated. It is true, of course, that on
direct review, unlike in habeas corpus, the Court is concerned with
the "correctness" of the state court's judgment. The judgment is not
"correct," however, unless the procedural ground is adequate, and
adequacy, as we have seen, is not established merely by a demonstration that the state court refused consideration of a federal claim
under a state rule of procedure. 186 The question, therefore, is
whether there are reasons for finding state procedural grounds ade184

Id. at 1350-52; 372 U.S. at 431-34.

185

372 U.S. 429-30, 433; see also Reitz, supra note 170, at 1344-45.

186 See

cases cited at note 162 supra, and text supra, at notes 149-53.
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quate to insulate the state court judgment from reversal on direct
review even though habeas corpus is available. 187
In arguing that the adequate state ground doctrine should not be
carried over to habeas corpus, Professor Reitz urged that a determination of inadequacy involved a more substantial interference
with state judicial procedures than a failure to bar habeas corpus
because of noncompliance with state procedures. In the latter situation, the state is free in future litigation to continue to insist upon
adherence to its procedural rule, while if the state ground is declared
inadequate, he argued, the state court cannot properly rest a decision
on that rule in subsequent similar circumstances.188 It is not clear,
however, that a determination of inadequacy has that effect. There
appears to be no decision that so holds. On principle, the issue that
the Court decides when it determines the adequacy of a state procedural rule is not whether the state may adhere to the rule in future
cases but whether, even in view of the state court's adherence to the
rule, the Court should not consider the federal claim. In any event,
the practical effect of ignoring the state procedural determination
would be the same in both situations: to put extreme pressure on the
state courts to ignore their procedural rules in deference to the federal claim.
Professor Reitz also urged that direct review differed from a
habeas corpus proceeding because the latter is independent of state
judicial processes, while in the former situation the Court remands
187 A possible justification for such a distinction, suggested by the Court's reference in Fay to "the web of rules and statutes that circumscribes our appellate jurisdiction," 372 U.S. at 433, is that the statute defining the Court's jurisdiction limks
it to consideration of federal questions presented in the state courts in accordance
with state law. The current statute, 28 U.S. § 1257, as its predecessors, see RoBERTsoN & KIRKHAM, op. cit. supra note 9, at App. A, requires that the federal question
have been "drawn in question" or "specially set up and claimed" in the state court,
in terms suggesting only that the issue must have been raised in the state courts.
See Note, 33 CoLUM. L. REv. 316, 318 (1933). Nevertheless, there is authority that
the quoted language "means that the claim must be assened at the proper time and
in the proper manner by pleading, motion or other appropriate action under the
state system of pleading and practice ..•." Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Mims, 242
U.S. 532, 535 (1917). To construe the statute in that manner, however, would require a conclusion that earlier cases in which a state procedural ground was held
inadequate rested upon a determination that the procedure violated due process, a
position that the Coun plainly has rejected. See Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22
(1923).
188

Reitz, supra note 170, at 1347-48.
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to the state court for entry of an appropriate judgment, thus effectively requiring the state court to consider a federal claim barred by
its own procedure. 189 The primary concern, apparently, is the potential refusal of state courts to comply with the Court's mandate,190
a problem that need not be considered in a habeas corpus proceeding because the district court's writ is addressed to the state's custodial officer. 191 At least two relatively recent cases suggest that this
concern is not fanciful. 192 Yet, the problem is no different from that
which the Court now faces when, under its traditional tests, it holds
a state ground inadequate. Normally state courts will obey the
Court's mandate. In the rare situations in which they decline to do
so, the Court's power to enter judgment or to take other appropriate
corrective measures are adequate to protect the federal right. 193
The distinctions between habeas corpus proceedings and direct
review are largely illusory. Even if I have overstated the similarities
in the two situations, however, it seems plain that the Court's decision in Fay v. Noia severely undercuts its traditional deference to
state procedural grounds that foreclose consideration of federal
claims. The subordination of federal rights to state procedure on
direct review cannot be reconciled with the paramount position
given them in habeas corpus proceedings. The impact of Fay, moreover, is not limited to criminal cases. If the state's interest in a system
of forfeitures is not adequate to outweigh federal rights in criminal
litigation, it is not easy to-see why it should outweigh such rights in a
civil context. Surely it cannot seriously be contended that every
violation of constitutional. right in a criminal case is more important
than any violation in a civil case. 194
1 89 /d. at 1342, 1347. Insofar as the argument rests upon concern for the sensibilities of state judges, it must at least be weighed against the increased irritation
over federal habeas corpus jurisdiction resulcing from Fay. See e.g., Desmond, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Convictions-ProPosals for Reform, 9
UTAH L. REv. 18 (1964).
100

Reitz, supra note 170, at 1347, 1354.

191

fd. at 1347 n. 115.

See Williams v. State, 211 Ga. 763 (1955); Johnson v. Radio Station WOW,
146 Neb. 429 (1945).
102

193

See HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 71, at 420-21.

CompaTe, for example, the asserted violation of constitutional right in Henry
-the introduction of unlawfully seized but clearly relevant evidence-with the infringement of the First Amendment rights found in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). A comparison of the penalties .in the two casesl94
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3. A proposed intermediate position. The implications of Fay, accordingly, provide ample warrant for Mr. Justice Harlan's concern
that the Court is moving toward "a severe dilution, if not complete
abolition, of the concept of 'adequacy' as pertaining to state procedural grounds." 195 I have previously attempted to demonstrate
that some dilution of the concept would be desirable. 196 If the Court
continues to adhere to its decision in Fay, even complete abolition
might seem appropriate-save only for the exception now recognized in habeas corpus proceedings, that a deliberate bypassing of
state procedure might continue to be adequate to insulate the state
court's judgment from reversal. That extreme a position, however,
is hardly more satisfactory as an accommodation of the relevant interests than the Court's traditional approach to state procedural
grounds that purport to prevent consideration of federal claims. A
doctrine that procedural default will never foreclose substantive
claims-such as that announced in Fay-ignores the values served by
orderly procedure. Rules similar to those employed by state courts
to foreclose federal claims are regularly enforced in federal courts.
Abolition of the adequate state ground doctrine as applied to state
rules of procedure can hardly fail to call the validity of similar federal rules into question. Yet, procedural values of administrative efficiency and fairness to adversaries are surely entitled to some weight.
Not all federal rights, moreover, are of equal importance. In at least
some situations, to state the strongest case, federal policies would not
be significantly thwarted by recognizing a state forfeiture rule as
adequate to bar the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction.197 In others,
the federal substantive policy seems entitled to less weight than the
interests served by the state's procedural rule.
The need, therefore, is for an approach to the determination of
adequacy that strikes an appropriate balance between substantive
rights and orderly procedure. That problem is not, obviously, a
product of federalism. As suggested above, it exists also when federal rights are enforced in federal courts. 198 Considerations of fedsixty days' imprisonment and a $500 fine in Henry and permanent loss of the right
to continue operations within the state in Patterson-is also relevant in determining whether constitutional violations in criminal cases are always of more importance than in civil cases.
1115

379 U.S. at 457.

197

See text infra, at notes 205--06.

198

See James, Book Review, 78 HAllv, L. REv. 1296 (1965).

196 See

text supra, at notes 177-79.
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eralism do, nevertheless, make the problem more complex. The accommodation of federal rights and state procedure must proceed
with due recognition that the Court does not have the authority, as
it does for the federal judicial system, to lay down a code of procedure for the state courts. The fact that every state rule need not be
respected does not require that all must be ignored.
The difficulty is in formulating criteria that will strike an appropriate balance. That cannot, obviously, be accomplished in the abstract. Such criteria must be developed by consideration of concrete
situations, just as the Court's present doctrines concerning adequacy
have evolved by decision of particular cases. Any attempt to lay
down over-all solutions to the multiple problems that would be
likely to arise under such an approach would, therefore, be premature. It seems appropriate, nevertheless, to suggest, by consideration
of several recent cases, including Henry, at least some of the relevant criteria.
In Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,1 99 petitioner's conviction
for resisting arrest was affirmed by a state intermediate appellate
court on the ground that the evidence disclosed he was guilty of
assault, a distinct offense.200 His attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of
the state supreme court, on a claim that affirmance on that basis
constituted a denial of due process, 201 was unsuccessful because his
petition for review had not been filed on paper of the type and size
required by the court's rules. 202 Although the state's rule did serve
a legitimate interest, as petitioner's counsel conceded, 203 it seems
hardly debatable that so trivial a default ought not to result in the
loss of a constitutional right of such vital significance to the integrity
of the proceedings. Even if forfeiture of constitutional rights in con100

376 U.S. 339 (1964).

200

149 So.2d 921 (Ala. 1962).

201

See Cole

v.

Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948).

202 149 So.2d at 923. The Supreme Court reversed without opinion, citing Cole v.
Arkansas, note 188 supra, and Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955). The latter
citation was presumably intended to convey the reason for finding the srJte ground
inadequate,. that the state court had discretion to waive the procedur~l default. The
Alabama Supreme Court had, however, consistently refused to hear petitions filed
on the wrong paper, see 149 So.2d at 923 and cases cited therein, and petitioner was
unable to cite a single case represenring a clear departure from that practice. See
Petitioner's Brief at pp. 26-29, Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 376 U.S. 339
(1964).
20a / d. at p. 30.
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sequence of a procedural default can sometimes be justified, there is
no reason why "every last technicality of state law must be sacrosanct."204 Shuttlesworth suggests two of the factors relevant to a
determination of adequacy. The federal right asserted concerned
the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. The state's procedural
rule, on the other hand, involved only a matter of administration
collateral to the primary purpose of the litigation. When both factors are combined in a single case, appropriate accommodation of
state and federal law requires a determination that the state ground
is inadequate to prevent protection of the federal right by the Supreme Court.
Shuttlesworth may profitably be contrasted with the situation
that confronted the Court in Henry. The precise question presented
in Henry was the admissibility of testimony that was concededly
relevant but which was arguably the product of an unlawful search
and, therefore, inadmissible under the Court's decision in Mapp v.
Ohio. 205 Only last Term, in declining to apply Mapp retroactively,
the Court recognized that the justification for the exclusionary rule
is the deterrence of unlawful conduct by the police.206 Deterrence is
not likely to be lessened, however, by the state's forfeiture rule or
the Court's acceptance of it as an adequate state ground. Whatever
the impact of the exclusionary rule on the behavior of the police,
the remote possibility that counsel may fail to make timely objection
at the trial is not likely to provide incentive to the police to engage
in an unlawful search.
The procedural default in Henry was, moreover, of rather more
significance than that in Shuttlesworth. A requirement of contemporaneous objection to the introduction of evidence is plainly relevant to the just disposition of litigation, since timely objection may
affect presentation of the opposing party's case. The importance of
that effect under our adversary system indicates the weight that a
contemporaneous objection rule ought to be accorded. There may
be situations, however, in which even the failure to make a timely
objection ought not to result in forfeiture of a federal right, as, for
example, where the federal issue involves the fundamental fairness of
the proceedings. 207
204 Han, supra note 8, at 118,

205 367 U.S. 643

2oe Linldetter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).

201 Cf. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278

(1936).

(1961).
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Additional factors relevant to a determination of adequacy are
suggested by Brown v. Western Ry .,208 an FELA action dismissed
by the state court on the ground that the complaint did not allege
negligence with adequate particularity. The Supreme Court, holding that it must construe for itself the adequacy of an allegation
claiming a federal right, reversed the state court. There is a possibility that Brown should be read as a substantive determination concerning quantum of evidence needed to support a claim under
FELA. 209 The Court did not purport to rest on that ground, however. It held, instead, that "strict local rules of pleading cannot be
used to impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized by federal laws." 210 On that basis, the decision seems questionable. The degree of particularity required in a complaint is necessarily interrelated with other procedures in the forum. Loose
pleading in the federal courts is justifiable, in large measure, because
of the availability of pre-trial and discovery under the Federal
Rules. States that have not adopted those procedural reforms may
reasonably require more particularistic pleading. It seems relevant
also, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggested in dissent, that plaintiff
was not forced into a state court but freely chose to enforce his
federal claim there. 211 By ignoring that fact and the interrelationship
between pleading and other procedural rules the Court's decision in
effect permits a plaintiff to frustrate the common objectives of both
state and federal courts.
An attempt to formulate additional factors relevant to a determination of adequacy would unduly lengthen an already overly
long article. The main burden of this section has been to demonstrate that appropriate accommodation of state and federal law is not
accomplished by either the Court's traditional approach or, at the
other extreme, an extension to direct review of the doctrine announced in Fay v. Noia. Careful attention to the particular interests
at stake should, however, yield more satisfactory results.
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See Hill, Substance and Procedure in State FELA Actions-The Converse of
the Erie Problem, 17 Omo ST. L.J. 384,407 (1956).
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CONCLUSION

It is nearly forty years since Professors Frankfurter and
Landis cautioned against consideration of "jurisdictional questions
... in isolation from the purposes of the legal system to which they
relate." 212 An analysis of the adequate state ground doctrine based
upon a pragmatic assessment of the varied interests which it affects
indicates that the doctrine is in need of modification. On the one
hand, by imposing upon the state courts an obligation to adjudicate
federal claims, the Court has unnecessarily interfered with the
power of the states to regulate their judicial systems. No federal
interest adequately justifies that interference. In other contexts,
where federal interests are threatened, the Court has taken too restrictive a view of its powers. The primary difficulty is the Court's
traditional willingness to permit a for£ eiture of fe.deral rights for
noncompliance with established state procedure. A general subordination of federal rights to state procedure, the consequence of the
Court's traditional approach, is difficult to justify on any assessment
of the competing interests.
Henry suggests that the Court may be prepared to modify its
traditional position. The danger is that it will swing to the other
extreme, abolishing the concept of adequacy so far as state procedural grounds are concerned. The main criticism of that position
is not that it fails to accord sufficient weight to the states' interests,
though it may justly be criticized on that ground, but that it ignores
the interests of both the litigants and the judicial system in orderly
procedure.
Determination of the adequacy of state procedural grounds, as
most other problems in the law, requires a more particularistic assessment of the affected interests. An attempt by the Court to undertake
such· an assessment will undoubtedly lead to a ·period of uncertainty
while principles are evolved, but uncertainty during a time of fruitful inquiry seems preferable to certainty that produces undesirable
results.
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